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Abstract 
 
The second generation fiscal federalism (SGFF) approach is used as a reference to analyze the political and 
fiscal institutional design of Bolivia’s decentralization model and its evolution. Subnational public finance 
data up to 2008 is used to verify that decentralization of expenditure was higher than that of revenue, 
establishing a context of vertical fiscal imbalance that increased due to growing fiscal transfers during the 
positive external shock (boom) period. Consequently, the subnational fiscal surplus was not a result of 
internal efficiency but of excess revenues from such transfers. Panel models were estimated to identify and 
assess the implicit incentives embedded in fiscal institutions of the decentralization model. Findings at the 
municipal level are: i) misalignment of local spending with local interests due to dominance of transfers over 
own revenue (dominance of central government development policies); ii) incentive to spend transfers faster 
than own revenue (flypaper effect); iii) greater marginal contribution of own revenue to positive fiscal 
balances compared to transfers, thus introducing the seed for a soft budget constraint but hidden by the fiscal 
surplus; iv) disincentive to generate own revenue (tax and non-tax) due to the size and growth of transfers 
(disincentive to the culture of contributing to own revenue). Findings at the prefectural
1
level are: i) 
misalignment with regional interests given the dominance of transfers over own revenue due to absolute lack 
of tax powers (until 2009); ii) high tendency to a soft budget constraint and, eventually, also fiscal bail-out, 
hidden by the fiscal surplus; iii) in only two departments collection of national-level taxes were higher, 
compared to transfers received in the same departments; iv) disincentive to pay the VAT (national-level tax) 
due to higher royalty transfers received, an effect not extended to other national-level taxes; v) high 
dependence from hydrocarbon-based transfers, and fiscal risk when this natural resource declines (both in 
volume and prices) due to volatility of international oil prices. Also, as a result of the decentralization model a 
positive and significant impact was found on education-coverage indicators, an important development 
objective of the national government. 
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1 From the territorial point of view, Bolivia is organized in 9 departments (intermediate level) and 337 municipalities. 
Before 2006, each department had a Prefecture as its executive branch (in practice a deconcentrated arm of the national 
government) and only municipalities were considered autonomous or truly decentralized since the Popular Participation 
Law was enacted in 1994. In 2006, Prefectural authorities were elected for the first time. However, Prefectures became 
autonomous Gobernaciones only after the new Constitution was enacted in 2009, meaning that they gained self-
government capacity through own laws emerging out of their legislative bodies (called departmental assemblies or 
Asambleas Departamentales). The Constitution introduced the new concept of indigenous territories, leaving room for 
misinterpretations (a fourth level). However, these indigenous territories (once they achieved autonomous status) are 
supposed to exercise their autonomy through the municipal level. 
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I. Introduction 
Bolivia’s decentralization model can be analyzed from different perspectives. In this case 
the proposal is to focus on the performance of fiscal decentralization
2
 under the conceptual 
approach of Second Generation Fiscal Federalism (SGFF). Under the First Generation 
Fiscal Federalism (FGFF) approach it is a function of the public sector, in its multiple 
levels of government, to identify and correct market failures such that social welfare is 
maximized. Emphasis was on designing fiscal transfers to correct for vertical and 
horizontal imbalances (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972). Criticism of this approach is that it 
builds theory on the assumption that intervention and action of public officials occurs under 
full and symmetric information and for the common good (benevolent government).  
 
The SGFF approach builds theory under the opposite assumption, that public officials are 
agents with political interests, and make decisions with incomplete and asymmetric 
information seeking to maximize their interests in the political context in which they 
happen to operate (Weingast, 1995; Qian and Weingast, 1997; Weingast, 2009). The 
literature on SGFF combines political economy with the economics of information, thus 
allowing analysis of decentralization focused on the implicit incentives contained in its 
political and fiscal institutions and the behavior induced by these incentives in a context of 
asymmetric information (Oates, 2005). 
 
Weingast (1995 and 2009) presents a set of conditions (D1-D5) for market preserving 
political institutions of decentralization and reference (in this case, a reference to 
"efficiency") for evaluation of other institutional arrangements. These are: (D1) a hierarchy 
of governments exists with each level having a delineated scope of authority, in other 
words, a clear vertical division of power exists; (D2) subnational governments have 
authority over local regulation of the economy and over public goods and service provision, 
meaning that they have the authority to adapt policies to their circumstances; (D3) the 
national government provides for and polices a common market that allows factor and 
product mobility, therefore promoting an effective competition among jurisdictions; (D4) 
all governments, especially subnational ones, face hard budget constraints to avoid 
spending beyond their means and bailouts; and (D5) the allocation of political authority is 
institutionalized, so that the decentralization scheme does not fall under the discretionary 
control of the national government, instead, a set of institutions must exist that prevent the 
national government from altering the rules. 
 
In theory the fulfillment of the five conditions ensure that decentralization would create an 
environment of competition among local jurisdictions (efficiency), this being the reason for 
calling them market-preserving political institutions. Failure to meet one or more of these 
conditions would help to explain and understand the behavior of other possible institutional 
arrangements. The objective of promoting inter jurisdictional competition should be 
understood from the perspective of (1) the sources of competition (D2, D3 and D4); (2) 
competition itself as incentive to implement policies in line with local interests (the deeper 
                                                             
2 Depending on a country’s political structure, fiscal arrangements between different tiers of government can be called 
fiscal federalism (federal systems) or fiscal decentralization (unitary states). In this paper both terms are used 
interchangeably. 
  
economic concern); and (3) the effects of such competition in correcting local misalignment 
coming from government and private agents as well as citizens of a jurisdiction. 
 
The following clarifications, additions and precautions should be added to this theoretical 
approach. First, in practice a country could implement a decentralization scheme different 
from that proposed by Weingast. Decentralization could be pro-market, pro-government or 
a mix in-between. The issue is that, regardless of the type of decentralization implemented, 
it still requires comparison to something in order to understand and evaluate it. Following 
the tradition of normative economics, that something would have to be efficiency, in this 
case the D1-D5 conditions. Second, condition (D5) is intended to function as a lock so that 
decentralization is not modified or reversed unilaterally by central government.
3
 The 
concern arises from the double dilemma of decentralization of DeFiguereido and Weingast 
(1997): what prevents the national government from destroying decentralization by rolling 
over sub-nationals units
4
? and what prevents local jurisdictions from undermining 
decentralization by free-riding and other forms of failure to cooperate
5
?. To survive, a 
federal system must resolve both dilemmas. For Qian and Weingast (1997) the solution is 
in the design of political institutions of decentralization that achieve alignment of incentives 
of political agents with the interests and welfare of local residents. So the fundamental 
political problem is the same economic problem of misalignment and its solution is again 
promoting interjurisdictional competition. Third, and as a precaution, for Prud'homme 
(1995) the idea of interjurisdictional competition is desirable while promoting efficiency, as 
opposed to it being destructive. Alternatively and not frequently mentioned in the literature, 
is the visualization of a desirable degree of competition combined with sub-national 
governments cooperating with each other spontaneously or as a result of incentives and 
regulations that come from the national government. 
 
While conditions D1-D5 describe the political institutions of reference, fiscal institutions 
refer to the design of detailed tax and transfer policies, the implicit incentives they lead to 
and results they generate. In this area, design of transfers is particularly critical for 
achieving the objectives of equalization, along with encouraging local economic growth. 
 
Possibly one of the most interesting contemporary experiences from the perspective of 
design of political and fiscal institutions of decentralization is the case of China (Jin, Qian 
and Weingast, 2005). In contrast, there is the experience of much of Latin America 
(Wiesner, 2003 and Finot, 2005). The Bolivian literature on this subject has been largely 
dominated by the first-generation approach. To remedy this weakness becomes the first 
challenge of the current paper. We will evaluate Bolivia’s fiscal decentralization experience 
using the lens of the second-generation approach, hoping to produce new ways of 
understanding decentralization and contribute to future innovations in this area. 
 
                                                             
3 In the Anglo-Saxon tradition the ultimate goal of decentralization (as opposed to centralization) is to limit the 
concentration of political power in a central government (Weingast, 1995). In contrast to most recent Latin American 
tradition the ultimate goal would have been facing the social debt (Finot, 2005). 
4 Abuse of power is known in the literature as "the problem of predatory government" (North, 1990). Its effect is to 
discourage economic agents. 
5 The attitude of saving or continue to fund inefficient public services, programs or public enterprises is known in the 
literature as "the problem of soft budget" (Kornai, 1986; Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003). Its effect is to encourage 
wasteful spending and not avoid mistakes. 
  
Regarding organization of the document, the second section develops a theoretical 
framework firmly rooted in the SGFF approach as well as contrast between both 
approaches. This contrast allows distinguishing between different possible institutional 
designs and their relationship with the concepts of market-preserving, promotion of 
competition and tax incentives. The contrast also guides identification of performance 
evaluation criteria of decentralization institutions. This framework is then applied to the 
conceptual analysis of political and fiscal institutions of decentralization implemented in 
Bolivia. The third and fourth sections use the framework’s evaluation criteria to identify 
and compute incentive variables and outcome variables for the subnational levels 
(municipal and intermediate or prefectural
6
). Alongside control variables are also identified. 
The next step is estimation of panel models using most disaggregated variables of 
subnational public finances. Thus, these two sections explain quantitatively why 
decentralization has performed the way it did. Finally conclusions are presented in section 
five. 
 
II. Theoretical framework 
 
The mix of political economy and institutional economics applied to the issue of 
decentralization, under the second generation approach, is complex due to its multi 
dimensionality. Therefore it is necessary to analyze decentralization through a theoretical 
framework that reduces the problem to some of its key elements, allowing derivation of 
implications to be tested. The framework proposed here conceives different decentralized 
economic-development alternatives depending on how several key decentralization policy 
options are combined. Assuming that there are only two levels of government (central and 
local) and following the conditions D1-D5 in a partial way, policy options could include: 
 
 
i) Administrative decentralization 
Vision and role of local government: 
- Option P1: Local governments produce only public goods. This option corresponds to 
a vision of development where government is involved only in correcting market 
failures and development is guided under private sector leadership. 
- Option P2: Local governments produce public goods and only private goods with high 
social impact. This option corresponds to a vision of development where 
government not only corrects market failures, but coexists with a private sector 
while taking leadership of economic development. 
 
Economic regulation: 
- Option R1: Local governments are free to adjust economic regulations to local 
circumstances and to local flow-needs of labor and capital between jurisdictions. 
- Option R2: Local governments have partial freedom (or none) to adjust economic 
regulations, established by central government, to local circumstances and to flow-
needs of capital and labor between jurisdictions. 
 
                                                             
6
 As mentioned in footnote 1, Prefectures became Gobernaciones after the new Constitution was enacted in 
2009. However, given that our data sample goes up to 2008, we continue using the term Prefectures. 
  
ii) Fiscal decentralization (from the revenue side) 
Local government financing: 
- Option F1: Exclusively through own taxes to local property and local businesses. 
This option corresponds to a local (fiscal) administration with hard budget 
constraint. 
- Option F2: Exclusively through transfers from the national (or departmental) 
government. This option corresponds to a local (fiscal) administration with soft 
budget constraint. 
 
iii) Political decentralization 
Local leader: 
- Option E1: The public authority (local-jurisdiction leader) is elected locally through 
a direct democratic process. 
- Option E2: The public authority (local-jurisdiction leader) is appointed by the 
central government. 
 
iv) Political economy of decentralization 
Local leader incentives: 
- Option I1: The motivation of the public authority (local-jurisdiction leader) is based 
on his own political interests. 
- Option I2: The public authority (local-jurisdiction leader) has no motivation other 
than his own social responsibility of maximizing welfare (benevolent agent). 
 
 
Policy options could be combined in many ways, leading to alternative models of 
decentralized development-structures. In all cases the existence of free mobility of goods 
and factors is assumed (common market), so this is not a policy option. The resulting 
arrangements could be those presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Alternative models of decentralized development-structures under common market 
Institutional design of 
decentralization 
Pro-market 
Model 
Pro-state 
Model 
Mixed 
Model 1 
Mixed 
Model 2 
Mixed 
Model 3 
Administrative 
Vision P1 P2 P1 P2 P2 
Regulation R1 R2 R1 R2 R1 
Fiscal Finance F1 F2 F2 F1 F2 
Political Election E1 E2 E1 E2 E2 
Political economy Incentive I1 I2 I2 I1 I2 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
In the pro-market model the local government produces only public goods and promotes 
private sector leadership of development; is funded solely with own local taxes; has 
freedom to adjust regulations to local needs; the local leader is elected in the jurisdiction; 
and, finally, is motivated by his own interests. This model corresponds to Weingast’s 
proposal, in the sense that local development will only take place if decentralization is pro-
market (assuming that the promotion of competition between jurisdictions will ensure a 
proper alignment of interests). By definition, the proposed pro-market model is pro-
efficiency, which means that it does not necessarily take into account equity considerations. 
 
  
In the pro-state model the local government produces public goods plus high social-impact 
private goods; is funded solely with transfers; has partial or no freedom to adjust economic 
regulations established by the central government; the local leader is appointed by the 
central government; and is motivated by his own social responsibility. The problem with 
this model, compared with the pro-market one, is that it promotes soft budgets along with 
subnational governments spending beyond their own-revenue sources. Also, the local 
leader must promote the expansion of a state-led economy without being able to change 
national regulations, but forced to follow central government guidelines. 
 
Mixed model 1 differs from the pro-market model in that local government funding comes 
exclusively from transfers and the local leader is motivated by his own social responsibility. 
The problems with this model, compared with the pro-market one, are that it promotes 
subnational government overspending and bail-outs because of soft budget constraint. Also, 
the local leader genuinely promotes expansion of the local private sector by adjusting 
economic regulations to local needs, even at the expense of local fiscal deficits. 
 
Mixed model 2 differs from the pro-state model in that local government funding comes 
exclusively from own local taxes and the local leader is motivated by his own political 
interests. Problems with this model compared (again) with the pro-market one, are that the 
local leader must promote expansion of a state economy in their local area, but unable to 
adjust economic regulations to local needs and with no financial support from central 
government. That is, the local leader must convince his voters to pay taxes for the 
construction of a centralized state-led economy. If the local leader achieves this goal would 
be rewarded with opportunities for advancement within the party that appointed him to that 
jurisdiction. 
 
Mixed model 3 differs from the pro-state model in that local jurisdictions are free to adjust 
economic regulations to local needs and local leader's motivations are their own social 
responsibility. Problem with this model, compared with the pro-market one, is that the 
highly responsible local leader is assigned to a subnational jurisdiction (by the central 
government) with the mission to expand the state-led economy in the area, having the 
possibility to overspend (supported by soft budgets) and freely adjust economic regulations 
to local needs. 
 
In all mixed models there is no reason to dismiss the coexistence of taxes and transfers in 
local government’s finance, with corresponding implications regarding a certain degree of 
soft budget. Similarly, regarding local leader incentives, it may be divided between a mix 
of national political interests and local social responsibility. The above are just a few 
models within a range of possible combinations. The exercise allow us to display 
alternative decentralized development models, simplifying reality to only five variables, 
noting that change of only one of them can produce a very different reality. This helps us 
understand decentralization in an integral way, beyond their fiscal specificities. The 
exercise also shows the advantage of having a fixed reference (pro-market scheme) that can 
help understand and evaluate other alternatives. Of course, that doesn’t mean that the pro-
market model must necessarily be the correct one for any context. 
 
  
Once the institutional framework of decentralization is defined (ex ante or uncovered ex 
post), and having identified the combination of variables P, R, F, E and I, it is natural to 
start asking how such institutions perform in practice. In this area several critical elements 
of assessment can be extracted from the SGFF approach. First is the idea of alignment, ie, 
whether the use of decentralized financial resources are in fact aligned with local people’s 
interests or rather with the interests and development vision of the central government (the 
misalignment problem). Second, the soft budget problem versus the hard budget alternative. 
Soft budget encourages subnational governments to spend more than what they generate, 
knowing (or betting) that the central government will not allow them going bankrupt. 
Third, the incentive to use own-source revenues (generated locally) versus dependence on 
fiscal transfers. A problem related to the above but with own characteristics is the flypaper 
effect, which comes from the first-generation literature (Hines and Thaler, 1995; Gamkhar 
and Shah, 2007; Aragon, 2008). It refers to a local government having the incentive to 
spend transfers more quickly than locally generated revenue. Fourth the absence of barriers 
to competition and/or interjurisdictional cooperation aimed at promoting a pro-market 
environment. Fifth the need to know if the institutional design of decentralization and 
implicit incentives had a real impact on development. 
 
The institutional design of Bolivia’s decentralization model (within the range of 
possibilities explained above), compared with the reference institutions (efficient or pro-
market), is presented in Table 2, summarizing the application of the theoretical framework 
and terminology to the evolution of political and fiscal institutions for the Bolivian case. 
 
 
Table 2: Evolution of Bolivia’s decentralization institutions under common market7 
Institutional design of decentralization 
Municipal 
level 
(1994-2008) 
Departmental level Municipal and 
Departmental level under 
the new constitution of 
2009 
(1995-2005) (2006-2008) 
Administrative 
Vision P1 P1 P1 P2 
Regulation R2 R2 R2 R2 
Fiscal Finance F2* F2 F2 F2 
Political Election E1 E2 E1 E1 
Political economy Incentive I1 I1 I1 I1 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
(*) Only a small proportion of large municipalities that manage to fund much of their expenses with own 
revenue from own tax collection could be considered as F1. 
 
Identifying the driving forces behind Bolivia’s decentralization process, helps explaining 
some of the results subsequently achieved. As a starting point, it is useful to turn to the 
analysis of whether decentralization was promoted by bottom-up or top-down forces. In the 
first case two possibilities can be identified: i) forces that have its origins at the 
departmental or intermediate level; and ii) forces that emerged from the municipal or local 
level.
8
 Although it is true that pressures from both levels existed, the departmental one 
                                                             
7 A more detailed discussion of this table can be found in the original article in spanish by Barja, Villarroel and Zavaleta 
(2012). 
8 Articles that provide greater insight on this topic are those of Roca (2005 and 2007) for the departmental case and 
Rodriguez (1995) for the local case. 
  
gathered momentum just years before the decentralization policy was adopted. Before the 
1994 reform, a decentralization law project with departmental focus was unanimously 
approved by the Senate, however, the project was never considered by the House of 
Representatives due to pressures of the main opposition party (Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario – MNR). In the municipal case, only provincial and departmental capital 
cities had elections before the reform.
9
 Also only 61 municipalities received tax-sharing 
transfers (Graham, 1997), making the rest financially unviable. According to Rojas Ortuste 
(1997) in the municipal elections of that period, peasant interest and, in general, interest of 
provincial inhabitants was low and poll absenteeism high. As a consequence, municipal 
presence (in practice) in the country was very weak, and its ability to put pressure or force a 
reform in favor of that level was virtually nonexistent. Regarding top-down forces, several 
explanations can be found, like an adequate institutional context in favor of reforms in the 
political arena of the national level (mentioned in Gray-Molina et al, 1999), an attempt to 
follow recommendations from multilateral agencies
10
, and an interest to use 
decentralization to compensate the unpopular capitalization (privatization) of SOEs policy, 
adopted by the national level. Another explanation (purely electoral) might be the one 
presented by O'Neill (2003 and 2005), who points out that presidential electoral procedures 
at the national level generated the incentives for a decentralization reform.
11
 There is also 
the need to solve the problem of a "state with holes" (in the interpretation of O'Donnell, 
1993) referred to the discontinuity of state presence given its spatial distribution over the 
territory.
12
  
 
In short, the explanations presented so far show that in the first half of the nineties a 
bottom-up demand for decentralization arose from the departmental level, which coincided 
with top-down decentralization intentions that had political and technical support. The 
reason why the latter top-down decentralization tendency ended up favoring the municipal 
level, can be found in the political vision of the ruling party that took office in 1993 (MNR) 
and the personal position of its leader Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, then president of the 
republic. As mentioned by Finot (2003) doctrinally the MNR was always against a political 
decentralization towards the departmental level, arguing that it could jeopardize national 
unity due to unequal distribution of natural resources among regions. Sanchez de Lozada 
shared this concern and rejected decentralization proposals aimed at the departmental level 
to avoid, in his view, possible confrontations and even secession (see Roca, 2007). So the 
only viable option for Sanchez de Lozada was to rely on the municipal level as the main 
territorial protagonist of the decentralization process, and made this happen through the 
Popular Participation Law. Afterwards, the Administrative Decentralization Law was 
                                                             
9 A total of 124, according to Molina Saucedo (1997). 
10 Note that the year of reform the World Bank suggested in a document that proper implementation of reforms required 
complementary policies like decentralization, civil service, and restructuring of the judiciary power (see Reid, and Malik, 
1994). Furthermore, note that Bolivia has been ranked by some authors as a country that followed “by-the-book” the 
policy reforms recommended by multilateral agencies (see Stiglitz, 2002). 
11 In the author’s words: “Because the procedures for choosing the president leave each party uncertain of gaining or 
attaining the presidency despite potentially strong electoral showings, every party has some incentive to seek a 
decentralized system in which power is more disaggregated and therefore easier to grasp at many levels of government. 
To determine which parties will favor decentralization, one must look to their support at subnational levels and at the 
stability of their support over time. Both of these criteria shed a spotlight on the MNR, the system’s most stable party 
across elections and the only party with consistent, widespread support throughout the country, particularly in rural 
areas”. O’Neill (2005: 157). 
12 This view has been widely developed in a UNDP report (PNUD, 2007). 
  
enacted trying to calm regional demands. However, in practice, that law only deepened the 
deconcentration scheme toward departments, using prefectures (former executive branch of 
that level with appointed authorities) solely as an operating arm of the national government. 
 
The above description is useful if seen in the context of what was proposed by Bird (1993) 
and Bird and Vaillancourt (1998). The contribution of these authors highlights the criteria 
needed to properly evaluate a fiscal decentralization model. According to Bird (1993), 
regardless of the stimulus for opting for a top-down decentralization, the main criterion for 
evaluating fiscal decentralization should be how well it serves the presumed national policy 
objectives, because when processes are initiated from above, the rationale behind the 
assignment of responsibilities to subnational units is precisely to achieve more efficiently 
the goals of the national level (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998). One of the most important 
goals of central governments is to increase the level of “national” welfare (as opposed to a 
bottom-up approach where increasing “local” welfare is the guiding principle). 
Furthermore, Bird suggests that when public policy preferences of the national level are 
clearly dominant, the appropriate analytical framework in this setting is clearly a principal-
agent model in which the principal (the national government) may alter jurisdictional 
boundaries, local government revenue and expenditure responsibilities, and 
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in its attempt to overcome the familiar agency 
problems of information asymmetry and differing objectives between principal and agent 
(Bird 1993). 
 
Returning to explanation of the variables contained in Table 2, it is only after the 1994 
reform (Popular Participation Law) that Bolivia adopted a true hierarchy between levels of 
government (D1 in terms of Weingast, 2009), with areas of authority delineated for the 
municipal and national levels. Even though a real vertical division of power was not 
formally implemented (this happened later in 2009 with the approval of the new 
Constitution), because lawmaking power remained exclusively at the national level; 
municipalities acquired important degrees of self-rule (administrative and financially). The 
following are the main features of the institutional context and evolution of the 
decentralization reform. 
 
The vision that prevailed from 1994 to 2008 (at the national, departmental and municipal 
level) was that private sector should lead economic development and government would 
limit its interventions to economic regulation and the correction of market failures, 
particularly the provision of public goods. The central government's concern with regard to 
subnational-level actions was rather dominated by social needs (a view consistent with the 
top-down approach where national preferences prevail). This deepened in the 2000s when 
public investment geared towards poverty reduction and subsequently to the achievement 
of the MDGs.
13
 Subnational productive development was rather left to the private sector 
under a common market policy and free mobility of products and factors across 
jurisdictional boundaries, which ultimately favored the concentration of economic activity 
                                                             
13 Four studies have addressed so far the impact of Bolivia’s decentralization on poverty reduction, three with positive 
findings (Gray-Molina, 2004; Grootaert and Narayan, 2004; Ajwad and Wodon, 2007) and one with skeptic results 
(Inchauste, 2009). There is also an old article that explored in a preliminary way (only three years after the reform) the 
impact of the decentralization model on inequality (Escalante, 1997) suggesting that a positive effect on equity was 
emerging. 
  
in the three main capital cities of the geographic central axis (La Paz, Cochabamba and 
Santa Cruz). This does not mean that subnational levels lacked functions or responsibilities 
related to the promotion of productive activities, because in fact they had, but the most 
important interventions had a strong bias towards investment in social areas (education and 
health) and basic infrastructure (roads, power, sanitation and other).
14
 Investment 
supporting productive activities was on average less than 10% in the case of municipalities 
and less than 20% in the case of prefectures, as can be seen in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
The change of vision, at all levels, came with the adoption of the new National Constitution 
of 2009, as it gives the state a more active and leading role in promoting economic 
development, reverting the orthodox market-led orientation initiated in 1985. In practice the 
new vision (strongly influenced by the ruling party’s ideology) came to reality through a 
number of nationalizations of strategic extractive companies, implementation of 
manufacturing state-owned industries in various sectors, restriction on exports to ensure 
domestic supply, and even some price controls at times of scarcity. 
 
 Figure 1: Municipal Investment                Figure 2: Prefectural Investment 
                       
 Source: Authors’ own computations        Source: Authors’ own computations 
 
Policies related to the regulation of economic activity throughout the period analyzed (even 
after the adoption of the new Constitution) where almost exclusively determined by the 
national level. Note that regulation is understood here in a generic sense, as the promotion 
of free competition where possible (helping markets work properly), the regulation of 
monopolies and oligopolies, and other mechanisms oriented to solve coordination failures 
between agents, reduce information asymmetries and prevent the proliferation of negative 
externalities. From this perspective both, municipalities and the intermediate level, have 
little or no regulation responsibilities. 
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 In an interesting and frequently quoted study (based on the municipal level) Faguet (2004) found that: i) public 
investment patterns changed with the implementation of the decentralization reform in education, water and sanitation, 
water management, agriculture and urban development; and ii) these changes were strongly and positively related to real 
local need’s indicators in these sectors, especially in poor rural municipalities. Faguet’s results suggest that preferences 
were properly identified and addressed, successfully re-directing investment to match local needs. According to Oates 
(1972) this will promote greater efficiency in public spending and, therefore, higher levels of development. However, the 
latter direct causal effect has not yet been tested empirically. It is also important to note that Faguet’s approach is based on 
quantitative targets, which is consistent with a top-down vision that seeks to achieve greater coverage-targets set by the 
national government (the focus on qualitative goals is more demanding in terms of local participation). In the current 
paper we follow a different approach. Our point of departure is that subnational governments cannot match investment to 
local preferences if their main source of funding are transfers and not own revenue, which has been the case of almost all 
municipalities (except big urban ones) since the beginning of the reform. 
  
As far as financing is concerned, transfers dominate over own revenue at the municipal 
level throughout the period of analysis. Transfers have been growing gradually and in the 
boom period (2006-2008) they experienced substantial additional growth. However, it 
should be borne in mind that the situation varies between urban and rural municipalities, 
since the former are in a better position to collect own taxes
15
 given their administrative 
capacity and degree of development that exists in densely populated centers. On the 
contrary, most rural municipalities lack these favorable conditions, thus becoming more 
dependent on the transfer system.
16
 These conditions imply a double-dimension funding as 
large municipalities could cover their expenses largely through own tax revenues, thus 
facing a hard budget constraint, while small municipalities are funded almost entirely by 
transfers, which puts them in a position of soft budget constraint.
17
 At the departmental 
level dependence on transfers was very high from the very beginning (over 90%) because 
until 2008 that level had no own taxes at all (thus establishing an administration with strong 
features of soft budget, with all the complications that this implies), and transfers received 
were also growing over time, especially during the boom period. In this respect, it is 
important not to lose sight of the fact that the national government collects in the 
departments (geographically speaking) all taxes that belong to its domain, and then 
redistribute them according to precise formulas (see Annexes A and B) associated to public 
policy objectives (top-down approach). Once the vision and its financing was established, 
the public administration was divided into a role of tax collection (responsibility of the 
national level) and another role of expenditure (assigned to subnational governments), both 
demanding important intergovernmental cooperation and coordination.
18
  
 
Even though the new Constitution and more precisely the Tax Definition and Classification 
Law (Law 154 of 14/07/2011) introduced changes to tax domains at the departmental level; 
these are not relevant enough to reverse their current dependence on transfers. Article 7 of 
the Law establishes that Departments may create taxes subject to the following taxable 
events: i) hereditary succession and donations of real and personal property subject to 
                                                             
15 Municipal taxes were until 2008: i) the real estate property tax ; ii) the vehicle property tax; iii) the tax that levies the 
transfer of these real estate and vehicles; and iv) a small tax on the consumption of a fermented beverage based on corn, 
called chicha. The 2009 Constitution added a motor-vehicle environmental pollution tax. 
16 Note also that the transfer system (see Annex A) is strongly based on equity considerations (with per-capita distribution 
as the main criteria) as is characteristic of FGFF models, thereby hurting small rural municipalities where population is 
reduced. 
17 Some studies like Wiesner (2003) have criticized Bolivia’s decentralization indicating that subnational governments 
were given insufficient capacities (incentives) or authority over public policy, allowing soft budgets constraint based on 
debt relief. The study notes that Bolivia would have increased transfers without increasing local responsibilities, 
something that is shared by the World Bank (2006). 
18 Note that all significant transfers (see Annex B) have its origins in the surplus generated by the exploitation and export 
of hydrocarbon resources, thus introducing an additional risk of transfer volatility linked to changes in international prices. 
Moreover, an important point noted by the World Bank (2006) is that the criteria used to allocate resources among 
departments does not serve to correct horizontal imbalances. An aspect that plays a key role is the geographical origins of 
hydrocarbons, where producing departments receive more transfers while non-producing ones receive equal amounts 
regardless of population size or wealth. This implies that transfers are highly inequitable between departments when they 
are evaluated in per capita terms. In fact, the new hydrocarbons law (and therefore the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons – 
IDH) has worsened the horizontal disparities. All these stems from an underlying element of Bolivia’s regional fiscal pact 
(according to the same World Bank document), which is that each time a “producing” department obtains a higher share; 
the “non-producing” departments have to be compensated with additional funds from the National Treasury (TGN). This 
imposes additional fiscal pressures on the treasury to access new resources unrelated to hydrocarbons. 
  
public registry,
19
 ii) ownership of motor vehicles for air and water navigation
20
 and iii) 
negative impacts to the environment
21
 (except those caused by motor vehicles, hydrocarbon 
activities, mining and electricity). The potential collection from these taxes will be small, 
but still represents progress. The challenge now is to build good subnational tax 
administrations capable to fully exploit the taxable events granted and complement them 
with an effort on non-tax revenue sources. 
 
As for the election of authorities or political leaders at the municipal level, mayors were 
directly elected from the start of the 1994 reform, while at the departmental level 
authorities benefited from this procedure since 2006. However, there are two aspects that 
can affect direct election: i) at the municipal level the experiences of the so called 
“constructive-censorship veto power”, set in the old Constitution, allowed the removal of 
elected mayors before the end of their legal term
22
; and ii) in the framework of 
implementation of the new Constitution the introduction of the controversial Article 144 in 
the Law of Autonomy and Decentralization, which provides for the temporary suspension 
of elected authorities after a formal (legal) accusation, has led in recent years to weaken the 
institution of election by direct vote, and to date there are several sub-national authorities 
who have been dismissed under this mechanism. Only recently (2013), the Constitutional 
Court declared that this article is unconstitutional. 
 
Finally it is considered that the political economy incentive of subnational authorities 
throughout the period was more aligned with their own political interests, rather than with 
social-welfare maximization motives. The mechanisms for removal of elected officials are 
indicators of the prevalence of own political party interests of local authorities, not 
necessarily benevolent but rather guided by personal political objectives.  
 
In short, Table 2 provides the institutional framework of Bolivia´s decentralization model 
until 2008, characterized as a mixed case (P1, R2, F2, E1, I1) and predominantly pro-
market in practice (a greater weight can be assigned to the P1 criterion, in addition to the 
common market), despite the significant government presence in centralizing policies on 
economic regulation, equity and decentralization-financing as a whole. The weakness of 
this model, compared to the pro-market (efficient) alternative, is that subnational 
governments are funded primarily through transfers, which promotes dependency and 
incentive to spend more than own revenue (despite the reduced budget-execution in some 
cases ), along with soft budgets constraints and misalignment with local interests. The 
strength of the model is that local leadership allows private sector freedom to develop in an 
environment of interjurisdictional competition among companies, with free flow of 
products, services, people and companies among localities, being this the most pro-market 
policy that prevailed over time, encouraging migration and greater concentration of 
economic activity in the nation’s (geographical) central axis. While on the one hand policy 
                                                             
19 In Bolivia the immediate predecessor is the National Free Property Transmission Tax, which will remain in effect until 
the departmental governments create their own taxes. Records show that collection of this tax is currently very small, 
equivalent to approximately 0.06% of total revenues. 
20 In a small country like Bolivia, with few aircrafts and structurally landlocked, the revenue-generating capacity of taxes 
like these is very low. 
21 Depending on design a tax of this nature could become interesting; however, evasion possibilities complicate its 
management. 
22 For further references see Luján (2004). 
  
promoted access to equal opportunity in education and health at the municipal level, on the 
economic front it promoted a policy of free factor mobility and strengthening of the three 
major centers of economic activity (La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz) that are better 
connected to globalization. 
 
A question remains whether the recent constitutional reforms established a new 
combination of policy options that will correct identified problems and improve the chances 
of achieving new social and economic objectives, given the new balance of political forces 
and current level of economic development. The last column of Table 2 describe the new 
combination of policy options (P2, R2, F2, E1, I1) which basically changes only the vision, 
from development with a pro-market bias towards a new pro-state orientation. However, 
given that the most pro-market policy has not changed, free mobility of private factors 
towards their most efficient use (territorially speaking), the applicability of the new vision 
of development can, in reality, be very difficult. 
 
III. Incentives in municipal fiscal decentralization 
 
What matters methodologically under the second generation approach is to measure the 
connection, direction and impact of incentives contained in the political and fiscal 
institutions of decentralization. This means studying the relationship between incentive 
variables and outcome variables, as well as the characteristics and strengths of their 
connection. This implies, first, to identify incentive and outcome variables and, second, 
estimate models contrasting theory with the Bolivian experience. The models of interest in 
the municipal decentralization are the following: 
 
i) A model to establish the characteristics of alignment; 
ii) A model of hard or soft budget constraint; 
iii) A model of own revenue collection; 
iv) A model of the impact of institutional design and their implicit incentives. 
 
Following Jin, Qian and Weingast (2005: 1732) the following fixed effects model can be 
used to estimate coefficients that establish correlation between the variables of interest: 
 
Yit = αi + γt + βXit + Zitδ + μit  (1) 
 
Where Yit is an outcome variable in municipality i in year t, Xit is the incentive variable in 
municipality i in year t, Zit is a set of control variables, the αi are fixed effects by 
municipalities, γt are annual dummies, β is the correlation coefficient to be estimated, δ are 
the coefficients of the set of control variables and μit are disturbances. As indicated above, 
the objective in all cases (except maybe iv) is to estimate the strength of connection 
between Y and X variables, that is, to accurately establish correlation, not causation. 
 
Estimation of different panel models is done with available and detailed municipal fiscal 
data obtained from the ForoDAC Fiscal Laboratory.
23
 The following are the variable 
definitions used, all in real terms (1990 Bolivians
24
) and per capita basis: 
                                                             
23 A government effort to generate a subnational fiscal data base. The project was discontinued in 2010.  
  
 
1) Total revenue of a municipality is the sum of own and not-own revenue; 
2) Own revenue includes tax and non-tax revenue; 
3) Tax revenue includes real estate property taxes, motor vehicles property taxes, and 
taxes on property transfers; 
4) Non-tax revenue includes technical fees, rights, patents and concessions, contributions 
for improvements, fines, penal interest, foreign exchange gains, other unspecified 
income, operating income, sales of goods and services, interest and other property rents 
and own capital income; 
5) Not-own revenue includes current transfers from the national government due to 
revenue-sharing from a basket of national taxes (coparticipacion tributaria) and the 
Direct Hydrocarbon Tax (IDH tax-sharing), plus capital transfers from the national 
government due to HIPC II, plus donations; 
6) Donations are not-own revenue and includes the accumulation of all kinds of private 
and foreign transfers, either current or capital; 
7) Total expenditure of a municipality is the sum of operating expenses, investment 
expenses and the remainder; 
8) Operating expenditure includes goods and services and personal services. It 
corresponds to an average to 89% of current expenditure; 
9) Expenditures on personal services includes salaries, allowances, social security and 
employer contributions for housing; 
10) Investment expenditure relates to projects or real investment, corresponding to an 
average to 96% of capital expenditure; 
11) The remainder includes all types of current and capital transfers to the public, private 
and foreign sectors, plus interest and fees and other expenses (this variable was not 
included in regressions). 
 
The following control variables were also used in estimating the different models: 
 
i)   Decentralization measures representing municipal and departmental institutions of fiscal 
decentralization. This measurement followed Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009). 
ii) Poverty measures. The initial asset poverty is approximated by the unsatisfied basic 
needs index computed by UDAPE for 2001 for each municipality; as an alternative, 
initial income poverty is also used, which is approximated by the Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke index (FGT) computed by UDAPE for 2001 for each municipality. Other 
alternative used is a measure of initial human capital, approximated by the human 
development index computed by UNDP and UDAPE for 2001 for each municipality. 
iii) Per capita departmental gross domestic product (GDP) as a measure of the economic 
environment in which each municipality performs. Departmental GDP fluctuations 
resulting from diversity of economic factors impact all municipalities alike. 
iv) An indicator of differences in initial local development visions, culture and customs, 
approximated by the multidimensional indicator of indigenous proportion, computed by 
UDAPE for 2001 for each municipality. It is multidimensional because it results from a 
combination of the many languages spoken plus self-declaration of belonging. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
24 The currency in Bolivia is the Bolivian (Bs) and in 1990 the average exchange rate was 3,17 Bs per U.S. dollar. 
  
v) Net initial migration as the immigration minus emigration experienced by each 
municipality, published in population terms in the 2001 census by the National Institute 
of Statistics (INE) for each municipality. When negative, the municipality is net ejector 
of population. 
vi) The proportion of population of each municipality engaged in agricultural activities, 
published in the 2001 census (initial). The opposite ratio establishes occupation in any 
other non-agricultural activity (mining, industry, trade and services). A more 
agricultural municipality tends to be more traditional and lagged in terms of 
incorporating innovations. 
vii) Geopolitical dummies as follows: High Lands include all municipalities in the 
departments of La Paz, Oruro and Potosi; Valleys includes all municipalities in the 
departments of Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Tarija; Low lands include all 
municipalities in the departments of Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando. 
 
Except for the municipal decentralization variable and departmental GDP per capita, the 
other control variables are constant over time but vary between municipalities. To take 
advantage of this wealth of information in practice model (1) is estimated using a random 
effects model. 
 
In order to provide an overview on the behavior of local governments, here are some 
stylized facts. Following the methodology of Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009) for 
the measurement of subnational revenue and expenditure decentralization (see Appendix C 
for details), we see that revenue decentralization at the municipal level was larger than at 
the prefectural level (the latter was practically nonexistent), but at the same time 
expenditure decentralization at the prefectural level was larger compared to the municipal 
level. Aspects that reflect an important design feature of the political and fiscal institutions 
of Bolivia´s decentralization model. 
 
As for the structure of municipal revenues, it evolved in a particular way. Figure 3a shows 
the rapid growth of public policy transfers (PP Transf) over the decade, possibly 
discouraging own revenues given that their participation stalled, which also reveals the 
degree of dependence of the municipal level to this source of revenue. A breakdown of 
transfers (Figure 3b) shows that revenue-sharing was the most important source of revenue, 
adding to it the IDH source but only in recent years, while the debt relief source (HIPC II) 
was always relatively small except in 2002 and 2003. 
 
Figure 3a: Municipalities revenue                Figure 3b: Structure of transfers 
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Also during the 2000-2008 period, a significant growth of per capita municipal income can 
be observed since 2006, consistent with the beginning of the boom period experienced by 
the Bolivian economy. The average per capita municipal income rose from Bs. 80.70 to Bs. 
385.68 during the studied period, with the strongest variation between years 2005 and 2006 
as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Per capita income by municipality 2000-2008 (1990 Bs.) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Average 80,70 
(81,25) 
71,16 
(66,48) 
86,25 
(90,49) 
120,71 
(80,41) 
144,59 
(73,58) 
171,17 
(93,87) 
283,10 
(266,58) 
314,73 
(248,17) 
385,68 
(339,17) 
Median 76,59 76,82 103,61 113,60 120,52 144,66 215,29 242,34 283,16 
Variation%  0,30 34,87 9,64 6,09 20,02 48,82 12,56 16,84 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
 
Figure 4a shows the distribution of per capita income of the 327 municipalities in real terms 
(1990 Bs.) for the years 2000-2008. Between the years 2000-2005 per capita municipal 
income was below 1,000 Bs. for all municipalities. Years 2006-2008 show that per capita 
municipal income increased significantly for many municipalities, even surpassing the Bs. 
2000 barrier in a couple of cases. It can be said that 2000-2005 corresponds to the pre boom 
period and 2006-2008 to the boom period. An inherent characteristic of municipalities is 
their wide dispersion of sizes also in terms of per capita income. Figure 4b shows an 
ordering of per capita income from lowest to highest for the 327 municipalities for the 
period 2000-2008.
25
 The graph shows basically two groups of municipalities if Bs. 500 is 
used as an arbitrary cutting criterion. Following Table 4, approximately 96% of 
municipalities belong to the group of per capita income less than or equal to Bs. 500, with 
an average income of Bs. 152.27 per capita. In contrast there is a small group of about 4% 
of municipalities with income higher than Bs. 500 per capita, with an average of 944.16 Bs. 
per capita. 
 
 
       Figure 4a: Per capita revenue                       Figure 4b: Ordered per capita revenues 
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25 Multiplying the 327 municipalities by 9 years produces a total of 2,943 possible observations, to which no data cases 
are subtracted, producing 2,878 cases actually observed. 
  
Table 4: Per capita income of municipalities in 2000-2008 (1990 Bs.) 
Per capita income Income ≤ 500 Income > 500 Total 
Number of municipalities 2.755 123 2.878 
Average 152,27 
(98,62) 
944,16 
(470,14) 
186,12 
(210,59) 
Median 136,50 788,35 140,85 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
Municipal alignment 
 
Central to the theory is the issue of alignment between revenue and expenditure. The more 
correlated these two variables, the better the alignment between the interests of public 
officials (who decide on expenditures) with the interests of citizens that generate (own) 
revenue. Following model (1), per capita municipal expenditure is used as the Yit variable 
and different individual measures of per capita revenue are used as the X it variable. The 
period 2000-2005 is considered pre boom and 2006-2008 is the boom period, so models are 
estimated for both of these, but also for the whole period 2000 - 2008. As shown in Table 5, 
several breakdowns of revenues are considered, emphasizing separation between own 
municipal revenues resulting from local effort and not-own municipal revenues resulting 
from national-level and foreign effort. The municipal population published by the 2001 
Census (initial population) was used every year in the transformation of monetary variables 
to per capita. The Table presents only the correlation coefficients of interest (Annex D 
presents details of estimated model for the period 2000-2008).
26
 
 
Table 5: Municipal correlation coefficients of the expenditure-revenue relationship, pc 
Dependent: Expenditure pc 2000-2005 2006-2008 2000-2008 
Own revenue pc 0,740** 0,250*** 0,348*** 
     Tax pc 1,792*** 0,221*** 0,217*** 
     Nontax pc 0,675** 0,338 0,537*** 
Not-own revenue pc 0,936*** 0,753*** 0,819*** 
     Revenue sharing pc    1,519*** 0,904 1,384*** 
     IDH pc 0,753** 1,035*** 1,106*** 
     HIPC II pc 1,708*** 1,181 1,748*** 
     Donations pc 1,056*** 0,605*** 0,896*** 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. See Annex D for details of results for the period 2000-08. 
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; pc = per capita. 
 
The first row shows that in period 2000-2005 a Bolivian of own per capita revenue was 
associated with a per capita expenditure of 74 cents. This ratio decreased significantly to 25 
cents in period 2006-2008. When revenues are not-own (forth row) then per capita 
expenditure was of 93.6 and 75.3 cents per Bolivian of per capita revenue in 2000-2005 and 
2006-2008 respectively. In both cases, correlation of expenditure with own revenue is less 
                                                             
26 In short panels, the emphasis is to exploit the richness of variability between individuals rather than between periods 
(appropriate given the heterogeneity of behavior of municipalities explained by variables specific to each municipality and 
mostly omitted). This determines models with greater attention to structural relationships. Also, when using variables in 
levels (probably not stationary) rather than differences (stationary), more attention is given to long-term or structural 
effects rather than short term. Annual dummy variables are introduced to capture the effect of time and reduce potential 
spurious relationships. Also dummy variables were used for department capital cities to control for the potential effect of 
outliers and spatial effects. 
  
than with not-own revenue, independent of the period. The result suggests that expenditures 
were primarily aligned to not-own revenue, confirming the existence of misalignment with 
local interests (as predicted by the SGFF approach). While in the first period alignment of 
expenditures with not-own revenues was already greater than with own revenues, the 
difference was not excessive, which no longer occurs in the second period, where 
alignment of expenditure to not-own sources of revenue dominate. 
 
Moreover, in both cases coefficients are smaller in the second period, possibly reflecting 
lower expenditure capabilities, but with relevant differences. Expenditure of own revenue 
decreases 66.2% between periods, while expenditure of not-own revenue decreases only 
19.5%. This goes along with the fact that not-own revenues tend to be spend faster than 
own, 26.4% faster in the first period and 201.2% faster in the second period, confirming the 
existence of a flypaper effect.
27
 
 
Within own revenue sources, both tax and non-tax explain the strength of alignment of own 
revenue to expenditure during period 2000-2005, the first more than double than the 
second. However, the strength of this alignment drops dramatically in the second period, in 
87.6% for tax revenues and 100% for non-tax revenues (as it is not statistically significant). 
Within not-own revenues sources, there is a change in the structure of influence between 
periods. In the first period all sources of not-own revenues are statistically significant and 
in the following order of strength of influence: HIPC II, revenue-sharing, other donations 
and finally IDH (the latter entered into force in 2005). In contrast, in the second period only 
IDH and donations are statistically significant, the first is not only more important than the 
second, it is dominant. 
 
In short, while in the first period there was some misalignment between expenditure 
autonomy aligned to own revenue, compared to dependency and alignment to not-own 
revenue, this conflict has worsened in the second period and predominantly due to the 
effect of IDH. In this case another effect can be added to misalignment and flypaper, that of 
the "natural resource curse" given that IDH has its source in the hydrocarbons sector.
28
 The 
third column of Table 5 summarizes considering the whole period 2000-2008, consistently 
confirming coefficients for not-own revenue sources greater than own revenue sources, 
reflecting the main outcome of the institutional design of municipal decentralization. 
 
Annex D also shows summary of behavior of control variables in estimation of the different 
models, which inform on context characteristics of municipal decentralization. The initial 
poverty variable measured by unsatisfied basic needs for housing and services (NBI2001) 
presents a positive sign, i.e. this type of poverty that has to do with public goods promote 
municipal expenditure. In contrast, the monetary poverty variable (capability poverty for 
income generation) measured by the proportion of households living below the poverty line 
                                                             
27 An observed empirical regularity in the literature. Explanation of why this is the so-called flypaper effect is debated 
since the 60s under the first-generation approach. For some authors it is an anomaly because it contradicts the theory 
(Hines and Thaler, 1995), for others it is just an econometric problem, but for most there is a theoretical explanation (see a 
review by Gamkhar and Shah, 2007 and the work of Aragon, 2008 and Dahlby, 2010). 
28 Following Smart (2007), experience suggests that people are more careful spending their own money (taxes paid), 
because they are aware of the pain of taxes and the pleasure of spending and because they feel greater ownership of the 
activity. Without local ownership it would seem that decentralization will not strengthen expenditure efficiency. 
  
(Poverty2001) presents a negative sign, i.e. it discourages or hinders municipal expenditure. 
Moreover, the variable that reflects local culture measured by the proportion of indigenous 
population (Indigeneous2001) and the variable representing main economic activity 
measured by the share of employment devoted to agriculture discourage or hinder greater 
expenditures. Instead the net migration variable (immigration-emigration2001) presents a 
positive relationship with municipal expenditure, meaning that municipalities that are net 
receivers of population tend to increase their expenditure, while municipalities that are net 
ejectors of population tend to decrease their expenditures. Similarly, the variable 
representing the institutions of prefectural decentralization (decentralization index for the 
departmental level - CRD) discourages municipal expenditures (crowding out effect), while 
departmental GDP growth generates an economic environment that encourages greater 
municipal expenditures. 
 
On average, the strength of connection or alignment reflects a mix of some "own-effort" 
with plenty of “dependency”, creating greater alignment of expenditure to the 
characteristics and conditions of revenues coming from the central government rather than 
to the characteristics and conditions of locally generated revenues, which would always 
better reflect local interests and generate greater local ownership. This specific mix 
between own effort and dependence, the degree of misalignment and flypaper effect they 
generate, their evolution between the pre boom and boom periods as a result of the "natural 
resource tragedy," and the context set by structural constraints of poverty, culture, 
economic activity, demographics, geography and departmental context, together determine 
what might be called "the Bolivian experience" in municipal fiscal decentralization. 
 
Municipal budget constraint 
 
A central issue in the theory of behavior of subnational governments is their tendency to 
spend more than they earn, when not-own revenue is their main source of funds. This 
tendency is known in the literature as the soft budget problem
29
 or the flexible budget 
problem. To test the theory, model (1) is estimated using per capita fiscal balance (revenue-
expenditure divided by municipal population) as the Yit variable and different individual 
definitions of revenue as the Xit variable. Again, this is not a model of the determinants of 
per capita municipal fiscal balance. It is a model to establish the strength of connection or 
correlation between balance and different types of revenue. Control variables are included 
representing fiscal institutions and the municipal context of poverty, culture, geography and 
time. 
 
As shown in Table 6, several breakdowns of revenues are considered, emphasizing 
separation between own municipal revenues (resulting in local effort) and not-own 
municipal revenues (resulting from national-level and foreign effort). The Table presents 
only the correlation coefficients of interest (Annex E presents details of estimated model 
for 2000-08). The first row shows that in period 2000-2005 each Bolivian of own revenue 
                                                             
29 Empirical regularity in which an economic organization has the expectation that its deficit will be covered by other 
supporting organization. In the area of decentralization, a lower level of government has the expectation of being bailed-
out by the central government (Kornai, 1980; Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003; Wildasin, 2004). Oates (2005) notes that 
a local government, in the presence of a flexible or soft budget constraint, will have an irresistible incentive to expand its 
programs and spending beyond their means. 
  
per person was associated on average with a fiscal balance of 55 cents per person. This 
ratio increases to 75.3 cents in period 2006-2008 reflecting greater availability of revenues 
for the same or a decreasing expenditure capability in the second period. The average for 
the period 2000-2008 stood at 67.8 cents of balance per Bolivian of own revenues. In 
contrast, the row of not-own revenues shows that in period 2000-2005 each Bolivian of not-
own revenues per person was on average associated with a fiscal balance of 10.2 cents per 
person, rising to 25.2 cents in 2006-2008 and average of 18.5 cents for the whole 2000-
2008 period. 
 
Table 6: Municipal correlation coefficients of the balance-revenue relationship, per capita 
Dependent: balance pc 2000-2005 2006-2008 2000-2008 
Own revenue pc 0,550*** 0,753*** 0,678*** 
     Tax pc      0,353*** 0,773*** 0,748*** 
     Nontax pc 0,598*** 0,628** 0,606*** 
Not-own income pc 0,102*** 0,252*** 0,185*** 
     Revenue sharing pc      0,250*** 1,189*** 0,461*** 
     HDT pc 0,536*** 0,175* 0,155** 
     HIPC II pc 0,180*** 0,867*** 0,400*** 
     Donations pc 0,056 0,325*** 0,267*** 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. See Annex E for details of results for the period 2000-2008. 
***Significant at *** 1%; ** significant at 5%, pc = per capita. 
 
This set of results, on the one hand, contradict theory given that the sign of coefficients is 
consistently positive, regardless of the period and if revenues are own or not. Theory 
predicts negative sign when not-own revenues are greater than own because of the 
incentive to spend more than revenues or incentive to accumulate deficits. The problem in 
the case of Bolivian municipalities was their tendency to accumulate surplus due to rapid 
growth of not-own revenues
30
 (Figure 5a) against a lower growth rate of investment 
expenditures in the same period, despite the substantial productivity increase of wages 
(Figure 5b). 
 
 
Figure 5a: Aggregated behavior of          Figure 5b: Aggregated behavior of 
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30 Not-own revenues grew at an annual accumulated rate of 84% in period 2000-2005 and an additional 78% in period 
2005-2008. 
  
On the other hand, these results are consistent with theory in the context of fiscal surplus 
because coefficients for own revenues are consistently higher than coefficients for not-own, 
independent of the period (except revenue sharing and HIPC in 2006-2008). That is, even 
though an accumulation of surplus occurs by high growth of not-own revenues, the 
contribution of each Bolivian of not-own revenue to surplus is significantly lower 
compared to the contribution of each Bolivian of own revenue (more than double in 2000 -
2008).
31
 That is, as long as there is fiscal surplus there is no emergence of the soft budget 
constraint problem, but the seed is there. A result that shows (again) another peculiarity of 
Bolivia’s experience in municipal fiscal decentralization. 
 
Following with Table 6, we observe the own revenue breakdown between tax and non-tax 
sources, both contribute significantly to the accumulation of surplus in 2000-2008 (tax little 
more than non-tax), when analyzing the behavior for the pre boom and boom periods, tax 
revenues have greater impact in period 2006-2008 and non-tax revenues have greater 
impact in period 2000-2005. This result could mean incentive to substitute one source of 
income by another, both own-sources, depending on the circumstances and context change. 
 
As for the four sources of not-own revenue, all contributed positively, but on average it was 
the revenue-sharing transfers and HIPC that had the greater incidence in accumulation of 
surpluses in period 2000-08. However, when analyzing their behavior during the pre-boom 
and boom periods, their contribution was larger in 2006-2008 than in 2000-2005. In period 
2000-2005 it was transfers through IDH which contributed most to surplus, despite the fact 
that IDH was implemented in 2005. Again a substitution of sources appears depending on 
the circumstances and change in context. 
 
Incentive to own revenue generation 
 
Another central prediction in the theory is that different sources of not-own revenues 
discourage own revenue collection, also in their different sources. To test the theory, model 
(1) is used to estimate coefficients that establish the correlation between own and not-own 
revenues for the identified periods. In this case, own revenue is used as the variable Yit and 
not-own as the variable Xit. Again this is not a model of the determinants of municipal per 
capita own revenues; it only shows the strength of the connection or correlation between 
different types of own and not-own revenues. In addition to control variables representing 
fiscal institutions and the municipal context of poverty, culture, also the per capita 
municipal fiscal balance is included in order to control for the fact that municipalities tend 
to operate in surplus. 
 
Considering period 2000-2008, Table 7 presents summary of estimated correlations for two 
cases of interest (see Appendix F for details). Case 1 includes per capita fiscal balance as 
control variable and Case 2 does not. The reason is the change in magnitude of estimated 
coefficients (and in one case its significance) when the fiscal balance restriction is included 
or not. As noted above, there was a tendency for a positive fiscal balance or surplus in most 
                                                             
31 Oates (2005: 361) notes that the soft budget constraint problem is a perverse fiscal behavior that cannot be solved with a 
simple recipe for behavior change to one responsible, because the problem is endogenous to the system itself, it induces it. 
Its solution requires reform in political and fiscal institutions such that the whole structures of incentives on budgetary 
decisions change. These institutions contain the seeds of their own destruction (Oates, 2005: 367). 
  
municipalities, and therefore a natural disincentive to own revenue generation, which is 
verified with the estimated coefficients under Case 2.
32
 However, our main interest is to 
verify if the trend is maintained after controlling for fiscal balance, which is equivalent to 
imposing a balanced budget. 
 
Table 7: Correlation between own and not-own revenues (per capita, 2000-2008) 
Case 1: Including balance Tax Non tax Own revenue 
Not-own Revenue –0,036 –0,035** –0,072** 
     Revenue sharing 0,017 0,050* 0,066 
     HDT –0,032 –0,032** –0,065*** 
     HIPC II –0,073 –0,094 –0,169* 
     Donations –0,033 –0,034* –0,067** 
Case 2: Not including balance Tax Non Tax Own Revenue 
Not-own revenue –0,011* –0,016** –0,028*** 
     Revenue sharing 0,060 0,077** 0,135** 
     HDT –0,018** –0,022** –0,041*** 
     HIPC II –0,038 –0,071 –0,111 
     Donations –0,008 –0,015* –0,023** 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. See Annex F for details of results. 
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
Under Case 1, Table 7 first row third column shows in general that each Bolivian of not-
own revenue induces a decrease in own revenue by 7.2 cents per person. A result consistent 
with theory: the opportunity to access not-own revenues discourages own revenue 
collection. The breakdown of not-own revenues into its various individual sources allow 
verification that HDT transfers and donations are the source of the effect of discouraging 
generation of own revenues by 6.5 and 6.7 cents per person respectively. Revenue-sharing 
transfers and HIPC, by not being significant, have instead a neutral effect. Continuing with 
period 2000-2008, when own revenues is broken down into their two tax and non-tax 
sources, a negative effect is verified from HDT to non-tax revenues as source of the indirect 
negative impact on own. This is in addition to the direct negative effect of donations on 
own revenues. 
 
Models of impact of municipal decentralization  
 
So far all models presented evaluate the internal management of municipalities with 
emphasis on ex ante or budgeted variables, such as fiscal revenue. This section seeks rather 
to assess the impact or external management of the fiscal institutions implemented, 
particularly on variables representing source of economic development at the municipal 
level. In this case, the strategy is to estimate models with emphasis on ex post explanatory 
variables, as are those of actual expenditure, including measures of ex post municipal fiscal 
expenditures, seeking to establish the characteristics of connection between fiscal results 
and impacts on economic development. 
                                                             
32 Except for the revenue sharing variable that presents a significant positive coefficient. The latter is not a result solely of 
the Bolivian experience; a similar result was also found for the case of Peru by Canavire, Martinez-Vazquez and 
Sepulveda (2011). The explanations suggested by these authors is that subnational governments have improved their 
administrative capacity to provide public services and to charge for them, in a context of growing demand and increased 
capacity of local payment. For the Bolivian case one must also consider the context of surplus balances and the fact that 
per capita operating expenses tended to be higher than per capita investment expenditure. 
  
 
Given that from its inception municipal decentralization was conceptually designed as a 
compensation mechanism for the "social debt", the natural variables to study impact would 
be likely to improve equal opportunities and consequently reduce poverty. Education is a 
variable with the particular effect of improving available social opportunities (decrease 
inequalities) and at the same time improve available productive opportunities (improving 
competitiveness) and thus, through their joint and interactive effect, contribute to poverty 
reduction.
33
 A necessary consideration when using the education variable to assess the 
impact of municipal decentralization is that, by design of fiscal institutions, the 
departmental level (prefectures) were to take responsibility for personnel expenditures 
related to education (teacher’s salaries), leaving municipalities the responsibility for 
financing expenditure on goods and services and infrastructure-investment, also related to 
education and according to local needs. 
 
The strategy for this assessment is to use net coverage rates of primary schooling, eighth 
grade approval rates, dropout rates and reprobation rates for primary schooling, published 
by the Ministry of Autonomy (2011), as dependent variables in four panel models for 
period 2005-2008.
34
 The main explanatory variables are ex post measures of municipal and 
prefectural decentralization expenditures
35
 as representative of the fiscal and political 
institutions of decentralization. We are interested in their statistical significance as 
explanatory variables or at least the significance of their correlation in addition to their 
direction and magnitude. 
 
In these models the control variables are departmental per capita GDP; health and 
education indices contained in the Human Development Index of 2001 as the state of initial 
human capital development; unsatisfied basic needs in housing and services of 2001 as 
representative of initial poverty; proportion of indigenous population in each municipality 
as representative of the local culture; initial position of each municipality in terms of net 
migration; importance of agricultural employment in each municipality; geopolitical area to 
which each municipality belongs; annual dummies and departmental capital city dummies. 
Estimated regressions are presented in Table 8. 
 
In the case of the rate of net primary school coverage (CNP), there is a positive elastic and 
significant coefficient for the variables representing the institutions of municipal and 
prefectural decentralization, both ex post. In addition, the elasticity of impact of the 
prefectural expenditure over coverage is 2.78 times greater than the elasticity of impact of 
municipal expenditure over coverage. However, neither of these two variables are 
significant in the case of eight grade approval rates (TT8). The initial average education 
attained by the municipality (iedu2001) is more important to improve TT8
36
, as well as 
                                                             
33 This impact assessment approach is consistent with the approach of the inequality-poverty-growth triangle of 
Bourguignon (2002 and 2004). 
34 It should be noted that only the first two education variables are part of the Millennium Development Goals. 
35The variable measuring ex post municipal decentralization (Desc.M) is defined as the ratio of municipal expenditure to 
central government expenditure. The variable measuring ex post prefectural decentralization (Desc.D) is defined as the 
ratio of prefectural expenditure to central government expenditure.  
36 Similar conclusions were obtained (with higher elasticities) when panels were estimated for the longer period 2001-
2008, but considering only information on net coverage of primary schooling and eighth grade approval rate, published by 
UDAPE and UNDP in the context of MDGs monitoring. 
  
cutting the dropout rate (TAP) and the reprobation rate (TRP). One aspect that cannot be 
deducted from the estimated models is how efficient was the use of decentralization 
resources for the educational outcomes it generates. That is, if the cost of generating an 
additional 1% of coverage and approving rate is reasonable or excessive. Nor can we say 
anything about whether the cost of the education quality acquired by the beneficiaries is 
reasonable or not. 
 
Table 8: Impact of fiscal decentralization on primary education (2005-2008) 
Variables CNP TT8 TAP TRP 
ln(Desc.M) 1,714*** 
(0,402) 
0,401 
(0,467) 
–0,121 
(0,191) 
0,035 
(0,088) 
ln(Desc.D) 4,769*** 
(1,032) 
1,929* 
(1,095) 
–0,694** 
(0,303) 
–0,411** 
(0,180) 
ln(PIBpc D) –3,337*** 
(1,222) 
–2,530 
(1,907) 
–0,723 
(0,486) 
0,037 
(0,366) 
isalud2001 -0,610*** 
(0,164) 
0,243** 
(0,105) 
0,016 
(0,024) 
-0,003 
(0,016) 
iedu2001 0,394*** 
(0,148) 
0,754*** 
(0,105) 
0,006 
(0,022) 
–0,049*** 
(0,017) 
NBI2001 0,246*** 
(0,095) 
–0,096 
(0,071) 
–0,022 
(0,017) 
–0,031*** 
(0,009) 
%Indigenous 2001 –0,072* 
(0,041) 
0,046 
(0,032) 
–0,001 
(0,006) 
0,015*** 
(0,004) 
Agropec2001 –0,212** 
(0,090) 
–0,088 
(0,059) 
0,038** 
(0,015) 
0,001 
(0,009) 
Migration 2001 –0,117** 
(0,053) 
–0,101 
(0,086) 
0,024** 
(0,011) 
0,004 
(0,004) 
CNP  0,637*** 
(0,035) 
0,043*** 
(0,011) 
0,034*** 
(0,007) 
TT8 0,359*** 
(0,026) 
 –0,039*** 
(0,010) 
–0,020** 
(0,008) 
TAP 0,419*** 
(0,106) 
–0,440*** 
(0,138) 
 0,011 
(0,029) 
TRP 0,515*** 
(0,116) 
–0,482*** 
(0,147) 
0,017 
(0,046) 
 
Constant 69,418*** 
(13,455) 
–34,550*** 
(10,991) 
5,928** 
(2,601) 
3,250** 
(1,563) 
 
Observations 
Groups 
R2 intragroup 
R2 intergroup 
Overall R2 
Theta 
 
1.233 
313 
0,252 
0,642 
0,613 
0,778 
 
1.233 
313 
0,160 
0,815 
0,752 
0,593 
 
1.233 
313 
0,207 
0,210 
0,210 
0,517 
 
1.233 
313 
0,615 
0,495 
0,574 
0,308 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. Estimated by random-effects model; however, when Tetha is closer to one 
becomes a within estimator (Cameron and Trivedi, page 256). All regressions include annual dummies and 
department capital city dummies not reported due to space restrictions. Numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors.  *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
In the case of TAP and TRP a significant negative coefficient is verified for the ex post 
fiscal expenditure variable at the prefectural level, which represents the institutions of 
prefectural decentralization. That is, this expenditure does have the ability to lower these 
rates, with greater impact on dropout rate than on the TRP, although in both cases inelastic. 
  
Instead, the variable of municipal expenditure that represent the institutions of municipal 
decentralization, is not significant in any of the two cases, i.e. there is no evidence that it 
helps to reduce these rates. It should be noted that these rates (TAP and TRP), that are not 
part of the MDGs, have characteristics that make them more demanding for reduction, 
especially TRP because it responds to more qualitative aspects of education. Indeed, the 
MGD goals of coverage rate and approving rate are quantitative, not qualitative (quality). 
The models suggest that quantitative and qualitative targets can be improved with 
increasing expenditure at the prefectural level (salaries to teachers that are administered and 
defined in practice at the national level anyway, given the former close link between 
prefectures and that level). In contrast, with expenditure at the municipal level, which is 
mainly for infrastructure, it is possible to improve the coverage rate but not the approval 
rate and less so the dropout and reprobation rates, which require the handling of more 
qualitative aspects. Qualitative goals are much harder to achieve and usually require a 
higher degree of participation, involvement and ownership of goals by the local 
beneficiaries, i.e. dominance towards local alignment, which was not observed in the 
Bolivia´s decentralization experience in general, particularly at the municipal level. 
 
IV. Incentives in fiscal decentralization at the intermediate level 
 
In the case of the prefectures
37
 a fiscal decentralization analysis cannot be fully 
implemented because at this level, rather than decentralization, what existed up until 2006 
was a deconcentration scheme. Unlike municipalities, prefectures didn’t have own revenues 
from taxes, and their own revenue was limited to the sale of goods and services, fees, rights 
and other revenues such as fines and interests. Thus, the share of own revenues in total 
revenue is very small, and its importance was declining over time. For this reason it is clear 
that the alignment of prefectures was towards the interests of the national government. 
 
This context raises three issues to be considered: i) since the prefectures’ revenues 
depended almost exclusively on the transfers from the national government, it seems 
reasonable to propose the hypothesis that these transfers have contributed to discourage a 
culture of tax payment; ii) failing to cover expenditures with own revenues is the basic 
characteristic of an administration with soft budget features, leading to the complications it 
implies iii) given that the most significant transfers come from the surplus generated by the 
exploitation of hydrocarbon resources, they  absorb the price volatility of those resources, 
creating revenue risk and uncertainty. This section seeks to verify the existence of 
symptoms of the first and third issues. For the second issue, significant positive balances 
were observed for prefectures in the period of study because of the increasing accumulation 
of transfers received from royalties and other (national-level) hydrocarbon taxes, making it 
difficult to isolate possible symptoms of soft budget in this context. 
 
Unlike the analysis of municipalities, where the total number is large enough, in the case of 
the intermediate level the number is reduced to nine prefectures (one for each department). 
That is why it was necessary to extend the number of periods (years) merging different data 
                                                             
37 As mentioned before prefectures became departmental governments (Gobernaciones) after the new National 
Constitution of January 2009 was enacted. Because the period of analysis corresponds to the prefecture era (under another 
legal framework), in the rest of the document prefectures are used as the unit of analysis. In some cases we refer to them 
as former prefectures, to highlight the fact that they ceased to exist. 
  
sources, taking care at all times that the different sources are consistent in their definition 
and size units. The two main data sources used to obtain information on revenue and 
expenditure of prefectures were: i) the ForoDAC Database for the 2000-2008 data series, 
and ii) the publication "Economic Statistics of the Decentralization Process", prepared by 
the Ministry of Planning and Sustainable Development, for the 1996-1999 data series. The 
disaggregation of the latter is much less detailed than that presented by the ForoDAC, 
which in some cases has limited the model building. Other data sources consulted were 
UDAPE, INE, Ministry of Economy and Finance and the National Tax Service. The final 
data set runs from 1996 to 2008 for some variables and from 2000 to 2008 for others. 
 
For the different estimates presented in this section, the following definition of accounting 
variables were used, expressed in real terms (1990 Bs.): 
 
1) Total revenue, defined as the sum of own and not-own sources of revenue; 
2) Own revenues: include non-tax current revenues, revenues from sale of goods and 
services, interest, property rents and own capital revenues. Notice once more that unlike 
the case of municipalities, prefectures themselves don’t have own-tax revenues; 
3) Not-own revenues: include royalties, current transfers, capital transfers and donations; 
4) Current transfers can originate from the private sector, public sector, external sector or 
other. Public sector transfers may in turn come from hydrocarbon taxes (IDH, IEHD), 
subsidies or grants, the solidarity municipal fund or the Departmental Compensation 
Fund; 
5) Donations: these may be current or capital donations; 
6) Expenditures: include all current and capital expenditures; 
7) Department GDP; 
8) National-domain tax collection (NDTC) in each department, geographically speaking: 
comprising the value added tax (VAT and Complementary Regime to Value Added Tax 
RC-IVA), the Transactions Tax (IT), the Corporate Income Tax (IUE and 
Complementary Regime to Corporate Income Tax RC-IUE), and the Specific 
Consumption Tax (ICE); 
9) International oil price. 
 
The following control variables were also used: 
 
i)   Municipal and departmental decentralization variables. These are the same as those used 
in the analysis of municipal decentralization. 
ii)  Poverty: several poverty indicators were considered, including the UBN, the poverty 
head count ratio and other indicators of the FGT family. 
iii) Geographical Variables: There were two main distinctions: i) by geographical area 
(highlands, valleys, plains), and ii) whether or not the department belongs to the 
nation’s central economic axis (La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz). 
iv)  A time variable, to capture trends in the different dependent variables. 
v)  Period dummy. This variable seeks to distinguish the 1996-2005 period from the 2006-
2008 period for two reasons: First, as will be shown, the period 2006-2008 was 
characterized by a significant growth in revenue, which, as in the case of municipalities, 
is referred to as the boom period. Second, in 2006 there is a change of regime from E2 
to E1, were prefectural authorities begun to be elected by direct vote of local citizens. 
  
vi) 2008 dummy. In some cases this variable is used to distinguish the year 2008 from the 
rest of the series, because in this year a new distribution of IDH was applied. 
 
In order to provide some information based on the overview of the behavior of prefectures, 
here are some stylized facts. It was mentioned that revenue decentralization at the 
municipal level was larger than at the prefectural level (the latter was practically non-
existent), yet expenditure decentralization at the prefectural level was larger compared to 
the municipal level (see Annex C). This is an important design feature of fiscal and political 
institutions of implemented decentralization. 
 
As for the structure of revenues of all former prefectures, Figure 6a shows that by design of 
fiscal institutions it is the national public policy
38
 transfers that have been their main source 
of revenue, highlighting the extent of dependence of the prefectural level to this source of 
revenues as opposed to own. Figure 6b shows that the dominant source of revenue 
throughout the decade were subsidies from the central government, but in the second half 
of the decade revenues increased significantly due to royalties and IDH. Subsidy transfers 
come from the National Treasury and is administrated by the central government though it 
figures in the prefectures accounts. It is directed to salaries of teachers and medical doctors 
(Espada, 2011). The rest of transfers originate almost entirely on the different hydrocarbon 
revenue sources. 
 
Table 9 shows average values of the prefectures’ revenues for the  
years 1996-2008 at constant prices. These revenues have more than doubled over the 
considered period, even more than tripled when considering the simple average. The 
average, weighted by the respective population of each department, grew from 143.35 to 
360.35 and the median from 161.79 to 421.13. As mentioned above, the largest jump 
occurred between 2005 and 2008. 
 
 
           Figure 6a: Prefectures’ revenues                      Figure 6b: Public policy transfers  
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   Source: Authors’ own elaboration.                                 Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
38 Includes royalties, subsidies or grants, IDH, IEHD, municipal solidarity fund, departmental compensation fund and 
other transfers, which are all defined at the central government level as part of national public policy. 
  
Table 9: Evolution of average revenue measures of prefectures (1990 Bs.) 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Simple mean 183,77 216,89 221,80 233,14 251,26 307,19 254,27 
Weighted mean 143,35 159,05 159,47 156,09 169,79 205,19 186,30 
Median 161,79 182,23 172,85 184,32 204,14 175,66 219,32 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  
Simple mean 297,93 379,90 508,06 657,68 792,28 594,86  
Weighted mean 225,66 241,01 295,52 365,04 370,06 360,35  
Median 226,45 252,49 322,85 455,32 322,98 421,13  
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from ForoDAC and the Ministry of Planning and Sustainable 
Development. 
Note: The simple mean refers to average revenue of prefectures without considering its population, while the 
weighted average uses Departmental population as specific weights. 
 
The fact that the simple average is consistently higher than the weighted average, suggest 
that prefectures of the less populated departments had larger per capita revenues than those 
from the more populated departments. This is the case of Tarija and Pando. The first is the 
main hydrocarbon producer, which receives a large share of its revenues from royalties; and 
the second, a non-hydrocarbon producing department, receives its revenues primarily from 
the distribution of hydrocarbon taxes (tax-sharing). These two cases are best illustrated in 
Figure 7, which shows the evolution of per capita income by prefecture. Triangles represent 
Pando and squares represent Tarija. Higher values correspond to Pando, reaching per capita 
revenue of nearly Bs. 3,500 in 2007, more than seven times the revenue of other prefectures 
which were below Bs. 500 per capita. 
 
Figure 7: Per capita revenues of prefectures 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Year
Simple mean Weighted mean
 
                                     Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
 
Model of tax contribution effort 
 
For the sake of clarity we repeat that the main difference between prefectures and 
municipalities is that the former did not have revenues from own taxes. However, it is 
within departments that national-domain taxes are collected, geographically speaking. It 
  
seems important to analyze the National Domain Taxes collection (NDTC
39
), in each 
Department given that these are paid by departmental taxpayers and used primarily to 
finance national expenditures, opening the possibility to generate a disincentive to pay them 
(hypothesis), because the taxpayer does not perceive directly the fruits of his effort and 
dislikes the distribution of that money among other departments with less tax-effort. 
 
The analysis was limited to the four main national-domain taxes collected in all 
departments: the value added tax (IVA domestic market and RC-IVA), the corporate 
income tax (IUE and IUE-RE), the transactions tax (IT), and the specific-consumption tax 
(ICE). Because the different hydrocarbon-based taxes return to departments through 
transfers, they are not considered in this section. Neither are the customs tariffs because of 
the lack of relationship between the place where they are collected (usually border points) 
and the destination department. 
 
Figure 8a shows the evolution and composition of national domain tax revenues for the 
years 2000-2008, in millions of 1990 Bolivians. The graph shows an increase in total tax 
collection during the analyzed period, with the two largest sources being IVA and IUE, the 
latter having experienced the highest growth. Figure 8b compares National Domain Tax 
Collection (NDTC) with current transfers received by the prefectures from the national 
level, including royalties and subsidy transfers
40
 in millions of 1990 Bolivians. It is noted 
that national domain tax collection and transfers received by departments have evolved 
similarly during the considered period. A significant decrease in transfers can also be 
observed in 2008, due to the new redistribution of the IDH resources.
41
 
 
Figure 8a: National domain tax collection       Figure 8b: NDTC and transfers to prefectures 
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For the analysis at the department level, it is considered the ratio of the revenues received 
by the prefectures through national level transfers (including subsidies), and the NDTC for 
each department. Figures 9a, 9b and 9c show these ratios for all nine departments, grouped 
as follows: Group 1, for the departments where this ratio was higher than 10 in any year; 
                                                             
39 An analysis of this type was made previously in Villarroel-Böhrt (2005), which evaluates the constraints (for example, 
the discrepancy between the legal home of a taxpayer and the place where the economic activity takes place) to carry out a 
process of this nature. A similar approach is also used in Jin et al. (2005) to analyze the case of China. 
40 It was already mentioned that subsidy transfers consist primarily of payments of wages and salaries to teachers and 
medical doctors. Although they are funded by the National Treasury (TGN), these are accounted for through a 
departmental account. 
41 By Supreme Decree No. 29322. 
  
Group 2, for the departments where this ratio was less than 10 but greater than 2; and 
Group 3, for the departments where this ratio was less than 2. 
 
Figure 9a: Group 1                   Figure 9b: Group 2                Figure 9c: Group 3 
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Source: Own elaboration.                Source: Own elaboration.                     Source: Own elaboration. 
 
The graphs show that most departments received an amount of transfers much greater than 
the national taxes generated in their territory, the exceptions being La Paz and Santa Cruz, 
where the received transfers were about half of the collected taxes in those departments. In 
the case of Cochabamba, the ratio ranged between 1 and 1.6 in the studied period. 
 
While tax collection is of national domain and not distributed directly to prefectures, the 
large differences shown in the graphs might signal to most contributing departments, who 
can deduce that their territories generate more than what they perceive, which could cause a 
disincentive to the effort for generating tax contributions. On the other hand, departments 
that receive greater revenue, through their prefectures, in relation to what is generated in 
their territory are not motivated to collect taxes, because they know that their revenue come 
from the taxes collected in other territories anyway. These assumptions deserve further 
quantitative analysis. Next section presents the correlations between the collection of the 
different taxes with the different transfers received by the prefectures from the national 
level. 
 
The model of tax collection effort consists in finding the correlations between the per capita 
tax collection and the different sources of not own revenues of prefectures, controlling for 
the other department’s variables. For each i and each year: 
 
 
 
Where x is a not-own revenue, α is the parameter to be estimated; zi are the control 
variables and βi are their respective coefficients. 
 
For this model, the panel is of size N = 9 and T = 9 (9 individuals and 9 periods). In the 
panel data literature, a panel is considered "short" when it has relatively many individuals 
and few periods, and a panel is considered "long" when the number of periods exceeds the 
number of individuals. Considering the first case, an appropriate estimation method would 
be for panel data with random effects and standard errors corrected for cluster, as in the 
  
case of municipalities. In the second case, it would be appropriate to introduce an auto-
regressive process (AR) in the errors. Since the data have as many individuals as periods, 
correlations were estimated using both methods, abbreviated with the letters CEC for the 
method that makes error corrections with cluster and AR1 for the method introducing an 
AR1 error process.
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 Table 10 shows estimated coefficients for parameters α for the IVA 
tax model, which includes the domestic IVA and RC-IVA. The data on collected taxes as 
well as the revenue variables are expressed in per capita income and constant values terms. 
 
In the CEC case, the number of controls had to be limited so that the number of estimated 
coefficients did not exceed the number of clusters, which can cause calculation problems in 
some statistics. While some coefficients change in value and degree of significance from 
one model to another, there is clear consistency in the negative correlation between IVA 
revenues and royalties, regardless of the estimation method and change in the control 
variables used. The estimated coefficient on both methods indicates that for every 
additional Bolivian of royalties given to the prefecture, there is a decrease of 9.1 cents in 
the IVA tax collection. 
 
Table 10: Correlation coefficients per capita Income Tax department 
CEC Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Royalties pc –0,091**      
IDH pc  –0,014**     
IEHD pc   –0,04**    
Comp. Fund. pc    1,778   
Other transf. Pc     0,003  
Donations pc      0,221 
AR1       
Royalities pc –0,091***      
IDH pc  –0,008     
IEHD pc   –0,009    
Comp. Fund. pc    1,354**   
Other transf. Pc     0,007  
Donations pc      0,167 
Source: Own elaboration. See Annex G for details of estimates. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%. 
 
With regard to the correlation between this tax and the IDH or IEHD transfers, the first 
estimation method shows significant and negative results. By introducing an AR1 process, 
coefficients are still negative, but not significant (P-value equal to 0.117 for IDH). The 
same correlation analysis was performed for IUE, ICE and IT, but in all cases all 
correlations were not found significant for any of the estimation methods. The fact of 
                                                             
42 In long panels emphasis is to exploit the data both ways, its variability over time and between individuals. Using 
variables in levels (possibly non-stationary) and not differenced (stationary) more attention has been paid to their long-
term or structural effects rather than the short term. Individual year dummies are introduced to capture the effect of time 
and thus reduce potential spurious relationships. The estimated equation is assumed to be a long-term equilibrium 
relationship; however the robustness of this assumption must be verified with a longer time series. 
  
finding a significant results in the IVA case may be due to characteristics of this tax that 
make it easier to evade, which would be consistent with the hypothesis that transfers don’t 
generate a tax payment culture. 
 
Model of correlation between prefectures revenues and gas prices 
 
As it was already mentioned, most prefecture revenues come from the surplus generated by 
exploitation of hydrocarbon natural resources. The hypothesis is that this situation creates 
high risk due to the price volatility of these resources.
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 In recent years, revenues from 
hydrocarbon natural resources have increased significantly because of the high natural 
resource price, and also because the export volumes have constantly increased. Figure 10 
shows the evolution of oil prices and natural gas export volumes. 
 
 
Figure 10: Exported volume of natural gas 
and international oil price 
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                                      Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Both, volumes of natural gas exports (left scale, in billion cubic feet) and oil prices (right 
scale, in dollars per barrel) increased steadily over the period of study. This explains the 
prefectures revenue increase, but also highlights the dependence of these revenues on the 
exported quantities and the natural gas price. Since natural gas prices respond to changes in 
oil prices, it is relevant to analyze to what extent a change in the oil price can affect the 
prefectures’ revenues. 
 
Table 11 presents the results of the estimated correlations between the different sources of 
prefectures revenues and oil prices (in dollars per barrel). In general there is a strong 
correlation between the different revenues and the price of oil. A one dollar increase in the 
price of oil per barrel, is related to an increase of more than two million Bolivians in total 
revenues of prefectures (column 1). Considering total per capita revenue (column 2), the 
variation over this indicator is 7 Bolivians. Columns 3 and 4 show the correlation between 
oil prices and per capita royalties, in total and per capita values respectively. Columns 5 
and 6 show the correlation between oil prices and revenues from IEHD and IDH together, 
in total and per capita values respectively. 
 
                                                             
43 Gas prices for export to Argentina and Brazil are determined quarterly using a formula that includes fuel oil prices, 
which are closely linked to international oil prices. 
  
Table 11: Correlation coefficients between income and oil prices 
 
1 
Ing. total 
(thousands of 
Bs.) 
2 
Ing. total pc 
(in Bs.) 
3 
Royalities 
(thousands of 
Bs.) 
4 
Royalities pc 
(in Bs.) 
5 
Ing. hidroc. 
(thousands of 
Bs.) 
6 
Ing. hidroc. 
pc 
(in Bs.) 
Petroleum 
Price 
2.271,2*** 7,118*** 838,9*** 2,108** 1.451,2*** 6,071** 
Fount: Own elaboration. See Annex H for details of estimates. 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. 
 
The steady increase in oil prices had a positive effect on prefectures revenues. Furthermore, 
the export volumes of natural gas in the last decade were steadily rising, which increased 
even further the revenues originated in this economic sector. However, this double benefit 
(increase in export volumes and higher prices) also introduced a double risk for the 
department revenues. First, export volumes cannot increase indeterminately over time, 
natural gas is a non-renewable resource and the reserves are limited. Furthermore, export 
volumes are conditioned to the needs of buyers. Moreover, the price at which natural gas is 
sold is closely linked to the price of oil, which introduces another risk factor given its 
volatility. 
 
V. Conclusions and final comments 
 
The conceptual framework presented in the second section identified two areas of 
application of the Second Generation Fiscal Federalism approach to the analysis of 
Bolivian decentralization: (1) understanding the institutions of decentralization as a 
problem of choice among a set of decentralization policy options, where any combination 
of variants gives rise to a particular reality or scenario, and (2) the existence of performance 
evaluation criteria common to all reality or scenarios, based on identifying incentives 
implicit in those institutions and the outcomes or behavior to which they give rise. The 
same section shows the application of that framework to the case of Bolivia, which helped 
to identify the policy options summarized in Table 2, which determined the structural 
characteristics of the institutional design of Bolivian decentralization and its evolution. The 
following sections presented instead application of the evaluation criteria to the identified 
decentralization institutions, with an emphasis on fiscal institutions. 
 
The goal of the "top-down" decentralization implemented was to contribute to the 
improvement of poverty and social inclusion indicators. In terms of results achieved the 
study only evaluates the impact of ex post expenditure decentralization of municipalities 
and prefectures on education indicators for the period 2005-2008 (coverage rate, 
completion rate, dropout rate and failure rate). A favorable impact is found, significant and 
elastic, for the net rate of primary schooling coverage. In addition, the ex post expenditure 
decentralization of prefectures had favorable impact on the eighth grade completion rate, 
dropout rate and failure rate in primary schooling. The ex post expenditure decentralization 
of municipalities did not present direct impact on these variables but indirectly through its 
positive impact on the coverage rate. 
 
It is noted that these results don’t say anything about whether the unit costs per unit of 
achieved goal is reasonable or not, against the alternative without decentralization or a 
  
different design for the institutions of decentralization. Also, while coverage and 
completion rates are part of the Millennium Development Goals, dropout and failure rates 
are not, the latter being much more demanding in terms of quality of education, on which 
not much is known. In this direction, the estimated models suggest that quantitative goals 
can be improved with increasing subnational spending under the current institutional 
design. However, the fact that after nearly two decades of decentralization, progress in 
education continue to be measured in terms of sixth and eighth grade indicators, rather than 
say 12 years of education, shows that progress in education is still modest compared to the 
human capital transformation the country needs. More aggressive quantitative targets and 
especially quality education goals probably require a higher degree of involvement and 
ownership by local beneficiaries, ie dominance toward local alignment, which has not been 
observed in the Bolivian decentralization experience in general and municipal 
decentralization in particular. 
 
Regarding performance evaluation of the institutions of decentralization from the 
perspective of their implicit incentives, the main findings were: 
 
(1) For municipalities and the entire pre boom (2000-2005) and boom (2006-2008) periods 
analyzed, a positive and significant correlation was found between expenditures and own 
revenues, but less than with not-own revenues. Under the second generation approach this 
implies dominance of alignment of municipal governments towards the interests and 
policies from the central government rather than to strictly local interests, in fact 
postponing them. While in 2000-2005 this alignment was already in place, however it was 
not excessive. In contrast, in 2006-2008 this situation changes with the rise of dominance in 
the alignment of expenditure towards central government, especially due to the effect of 
Direct Hydrocarbon Tax (IDH) in the increase of transfers. This may well have resulted, 
not only because decentralization was implemented "top-down" but because initial local 
capacities were weak or nonexistent, which was precisely what needed to be changed, 
especially in the less urban and rural areas, given high dispersion and heterogeneity among 
locals. The slow progress in education also suggests modest changes of this reality. 
 
Moreover, under the first generation approach, the same result is non-other than the 
flypaper effect. This is an old theme in the literature referred to the observed regularity that 
subnational governments tend to spend not-own revenues, resulting from the effort of 
others (transfers), much faster than own revenues resulting from local effort. This behavior 
results from the distorting effects of the increasing dominance of transfers in municipal 
revenues, because locals don’t know and don’t internalize the costs of their procurement by 
the central government. Indeed, for the subnational government the received transfers are 
basically free ex ante and ex post: (i) Ex ante because subnationals don’t pay the central 
government for the administrative and political costs of tax collection and its distribution. 
Once subnationals receive their transfers they only internalize the costs of budget 
execution, from planning to their disbursement, monitoring and accountability; (ii) Ex post 
because subnationals don’t pay the central government or society at large for the costs of 
total or partial failure in achieving the objectives or social goals. Strictly speaking, meeting 
a quantitative education target (for example, a net enrollment or completion target) can very 
well be accompanied by a partial or even complete failure of qualitative results (for 
example, passing a minimum knowledge standard test). 
  
 
2) For municipalities and the entire period of study (2000-2008), the correlation of fiscal 
balance with own revenues is positive and higher than correlation with not-own revenues, 
in a context of fiscal surplus dominance. Under the first-generation approach, the fiscal 
surplus is not a result of internal efficiency but an imbalance due to excessive revenues and 
low spending capacity (excessive revenues occurred mainly in the boom period). Under the 
second-generation approach, own revenues contribute much more to balance than not-own, 
also more so in the boom period than in the pre boom, reflecting a soft budget problem but 
in a context of surplus. That is, the problem of soft budget constraint, which is central to the 
second generation approach, is not a problem in the Bolivian case due to the increasing 
accumulation of fiscal surpluses (not binding), however, it is there as seed to deficit 
incentive to operate in the future, particularly at a time of major economic recession. 
 
(3) For municipalities in the analyzed period (2000-2008), a negative relationship between 
own and not-own revenues was verified, ie a disincentive to the generation of own revenues 
as transfers increased (disincentive to the culture of local tax payment or from the 
perspective of public goods, disincentive to the culture of local contribution). The 
disincentive was not as important during the pre-boom than during the boom period. This 
outcome is a result of institutional design. Transfers were the main source of financing of 
municipalities, generating dependency and disincentive to effort and other local distortions. 
Initially, it was the revenue sharing (coparticipación tributaria) and debt relief transfers 
(HIPC) that dominated, but later the IDH transfer was dominant, which in turn is dependent 
on international oil prices. While transfers are necessary and their increase good news, in 
their practical implementation these should have been tied to local contribution goals (tax 
and non-tax), regardless that in most cases these might have been relatively modest 
compared to the magnitude of transfers, because that would maintain the culture of local 
contribution. However, this requirement contrasts with the fact that on average most 
municipalities have persistent surpluses, so there was no need for greater revenues and the 
proportional decrease of own revenues was not missed. However, when the surpluses 
disappear in a major economic recession, reversing the behavior of low local contribution 
will be difficult. This is why the current not committed surplus of municipalities should go 
to an investment fund for a rainy day, so that in the present there would be need to raise 
local contributions. 
 
(4) In the case of the former prefectures (governorships now) and for the entire period of 
study (1996-2008), their revenues came from different types of transfers, as by design they 
had no access to own taxes. For this reason, alignment of their expenditure toward the 
central government was predominant and, therefore, misalignment to strictly local interests. 
As transfers are basically 100% of prefectural revenues, an overspending tendency would 
be expected and, therefore, a tendency to the soft budget problem. This issue was not 
verified because prefectures showed rather a tendency to surplus, not by their own effort or 
internal efficiency but because of excessive revenues resulting from the continuous and 
automatic increase of some of the transfers, especially those originating in the hydrocarbon 
sector. 
 
(5) Given the characteristics of the institutional framework of fiscal decentralization at the 
prefectural level, were received transfers originate from national level collection of taxes 
  
and royalties, an attempt was made to verify if such transfers generated implicit incentives, 
positive or negative, toward tax payments of national domain. The hypothesis was that 
transfers do not encourage a culture of tax payment (regardless of the level of dominion), in 
those departments that generate more national taxes than transfers received via their 
prefectures, as in those receiving more transfers than the national taxes they generate. 
Specifically, we looked for correlations between the different types of transfers received 
(royalties, IDH, IEHD, compensation fund and other transfers and donations) and the 
different types of national taxes collected in each department (IVA, IUE, ICE and IT). As a 
result only a negative and significant correlation was found (disincentive) between royalty 
transfers and the IVA collection. Correlations from all other combinations were not found 
statistically significant, neither positive nor negative, highlighting statistical independence 
between the two types of variables. 
 
6) It was also verified that the increase in international oil prices had a statistically 
significant positive effect on prefecture revenues (seven Bolivians of per capita revenue on 
average for every dollar increase in the price of oil). This implies that prefectural revenues 
can not only decrease once there is a drop in international oil prices, but also fluctuate at the 
rhythm of the volatility of that price. Also it should be noted that the increase in revenues in 
the hydrocarbon sector over the period studied was due not only to the increase in their 
prices, but also to the constant increase in the volume produced and exported. These 
volumes cannot increase indefinitely as there are limitations of supply and demand. 
 
All of the issues discussed above under the scope of the fiscal institutions of municipal and 
prefectural decentralization, are in effect considered institutional obstacles that affect local 
economic development in Bolivia. If these are kept without any changes over time, the 
consequence would be ever greater disincentive to own revenue generation and dependence 
on transfers from central government, resulting in a major rent-seeking culture rather than 
the culture of local contribution (tax and non-tax). 
 
The increased reliance of sub-national levels on transfers from central government, also 
threatens the central government itself, especially once those surpluses disappear, who 
would frequently find itself in rescue or bail out missions in particular of those subnational 
governments too big to let them fall into bankruptcy (soft budget problem + too big to fail). 
Subnational governments could also fall into liquidity and/or solvency problems due to 
internal management problems or in other cases by problems beyond their control, such as 
adverse external shocks (in particular volatility and drops in the international price of oil). 
But probably the worst of consequences of doing nothing would be the growing 
misalignment of subnational governments with their own local interests. The latter because 
it is local interests that encourage the participation of local jurisdiction citizens determined 
to find solutions to local problems and implement them through their governments in 
coordination with other levels. It is local participation that allows the buildup of an 
institutional framework of decentralization from the bottom up and not the other way 
around. 
 
An already suggested solution to this problem is to link transfers to local contribution 
targets (tax and non-tax) at the subnational level. This would help solve the flypaper effect, 
reduce the seed of the soft budget problem, reduce the risks associated with oil price 
  
volatility and also improve incentives to own revenue generation, but would not solve the 
misalignment problem. Moreover, this proposal implies a policy change that may be 
difficult to achieve, besides being identified as unfair since only the largest and more 
developed subnationals would have a real chance to increase own revenues. Thus a mixed 
system could be established between free transfers and transfers subject to local 
contribution goals, which could vary according to some classification of subnationals. 
However, any solution linking transfers to own revenue generation, must first solve the 
problem of the need to generate revenues in addition to transfers received or the existence 
of subnational fiscal surpluses. The not committed subnational surpluses should be 
accumulated in a fund on a separate reserve account for a rainy day, which could be 
administered by a specialized investor. 
 
The misalignment problem is more related to the local definition of the objectives of 
decentralization, which should be aligned to "strictly local interests." While the MDGs 
could be quantitative goals of decentralization for the central government, more qualitative 
goals in health, education and housing could be part of local interests. Similarly, 
employment and income generation goals could be economic goals of greatest local 
interest. On the one hand, transfers could be linked to achievements expressed in MDG 
goals, but could also be linked to achievements expressed in goals established by strictly 
local interests. Undoubtedly, the second road is more demanding in terms of local 
participation, plus it requires a behavior change in central government. Here it is possible 
that the central government could anyway insist on national social goals; new quantitative 
minimums, this time accompanied by qualitative minimums. However, subnational 
governments could add to these other more local goals in basic infrastructure (water, 
energy, transportation and communications associated with home improvement projects) 
and even support economic growth goals (development of organizations dedicated to 
production, industry, commerce and entertainment) in order to exploit all possible sources 
of local employment generation. 
 
While linking transfers to outcomes helps to solve the problem of ex post costs, it has no 
relationship with ex ante costs where other distortionary incentive problems arise. This 
means that the solution of the problem of passing the ex-ante and ex post costs 
simultaneously to subnationals involves substantial local participation in defining the 
objetives and goals of interest to the jurisdiction, plus the local leadership commitment to 
greater own revenue collection and effective local effort in meeting fiscal collection goals. 
In short, a more interconnected and coordinated local involvement that goes beyond the 
purely political, since it requires design of more technical processes, coordinated and above 
all real local effort. 
 
The question now is what should be the design of the institutions of decentralization such 
that it accomplishes the highest degree of achievement of the objectives of local 
development, taking advantage of the involvement, enthusiasm and local effort that would 
allow a combination of own and not-own revenues (probably with dominance of not-own) 
so as to minimize the risk of self-destructive behavior (misalignment, flypaper, soft budget 
and the disincentive to own revenue generation). Perhaps the answer is already contained in 
the approach of autonomies as a vision of local development, because it captures the need 
that decentralization responds to bottom up processes and not the other way around. In this 
  
direction, the local contribution not only achieves economic objectives (locals contribute to 
spending and investment in the goods and services they need, according to their valuations 
and budget constraints) and administrative objectives (contributes to the culture of local 
contribution and improves the culture of surveillance and accountability), but also political 
objectives, because the greater is the local contribution the greater is the voice and 
influence in decisions over the use of resources and therefore greater autonomy and 
evolutionary goals, because the institutions of decentralization must genuinely seek to free 
the local economic potential, which corresponds to a more productive decentralization 
rather than purely distributive, requiring greater local control of decisions about the 
allocation of resources. Because of its importance, the correction of incentives in the 
institutional design requires political will and leadership from all players. The local 
contribution requires that locals are convinced that it is the way for increasing control of 
their own development and also requires that the central government wants to transfer that 
greater control to locals, through the management of incentives connected to transfers. 
 
 
References 
 
Ajwad, M. I., Wodon, Q. (2007). “Do local Governments Maximize Access Rates to Public Services across 
Areas? A Test Based on Marginal Benefit Incidence Analysis”, The Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance Vol. 47 No. 2, pp. 242-260. 
 
Aragon, Fernando M. (2008). “The Flypaper Effect Revisited”, The Suntory Centre, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, EOPP/2009/4. 
 
Banco Mundial (2006). “Hacia una descentralización incluyente”, Tomo II: Análisis Técnico Detallado, 
Análisis de la Situación Institucional y de Gobernabilidad (IGR), La Paz: Banco Mundial. 
 
Barja, Gover, Sergio Villarroel and David Zavaleta (2012). Diseño institucional e incentivos implícitos en 
la descentralización boliviana. La Paz: Fundación PIEB Editores, PIEB-MpD/UCB. 
 
Barrios Suvelza, Franz Xavier (2002). “El Estado triterritorial: Una nueva descentralización para Bolivia”. 
La Paz: Plural Editores, FES-ILDIS. 
 
Bird, R. M. (1993). “Threading the Fiscal Labyrinth: Some Issues in Fiscal Decentralization”, National Tax 
Journal Vol. 46 No. 2, Junio, pp. 207-227. 
 
Bird, R. M. and Vaillancourt, F. editors (1998). “Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries”. New 
York y Londres: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bourguignon, François (2002). “The Growth Elasticity of Poverty Reduction: Explaining Heterogeneity 
across countries and Time Periods”. Working Paper No. 2002-03. DELTA and The World Bank. 
 
Bourguignon, François (2004). “The Poverty-Growth-Inequality Triangle”. The World Bank. 
 
Cameron, A. Colin and Pravin K. Trivedi. (2009). “Microeconometrics Using Stata.” US: Stata Press. 
 
Canavire-Bacarreza, G., Martinez-Vazquez, J. and Sepulveda, C. (2011). “Subnational Revenue 
Mobilization in Peru”. IADB Research Network Project. Forthcoming. 
 
DeFiguereido, Rui and Barry Weingast (1997). Self-enforcing federalism. Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization 21, 103-135. 
 
  
Escalante, S. (1997). “La Participación Popular y sus Efectos sobre la Equidad: Un Análisis a Partir de la 
Evolución de los Planes Anuales Operativos Municipales”, en: G. Gray-Molina (editor) Participación 
Popular: Construyendo Políticas Públicas Locales en Bolivia. La Paz: Unidad de Análisis de Políticas 
Sociales (UDAPSO). 
 
Espada, J.L. (2011). Financiamiento y gasto de las Gobernaciones: Autonomía sin reforma, Centro de 
Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA). Serie Transparencia Fiscal, La Paz, Marzo. 
 
Faguet, J. P. (2004). “Does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local needs? Evidence 
from Bolivia”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 88 No. 4, pp. 867-893. 
 
Finot, Iván (2003). “El proceso boliviano de descentralización: análisis comparativo y pautas para seguir 
adelante”, en: La descentralización que se viene: propuestas para la (re)constitución del nivel estatal 
intermedio. La Paz: Plural Editores – FES/ILDIS, pp. 131-167. 
 
Finot, Ivan (2005). “Descentralización, transferencias territoriales y desarrollo local”. Revista de la CEPAL, 
No. 86, pp. 29-46. 
 
Gamkhar, Shama and Anwar Shah (2007). “The Impact of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: A 
Synthesis of the Conceptual and Empirical Literature”, en: Robin Boadway y Anwar Shah (editores), 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: Principles and Practice, Public Sector Governance and Accountability 
Series, Washington: World Bank, pp. 225-258. 
 
Graham, C. (1997). “Apoyo para las Reformas de Mercado en Bolivia: Los Programas de Capitalización y 
Participación Popular” en: M. H. Peirce (editora), Capitalización: El Modelo Boliviano de Reforma Social y 
Económica, Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Center, North South Center, pp. 23-70. 
 
Gray-Molina, G., Pérez de Rada, E. and Yañez, E. (1999). “La Economía Política de Reformas 
Institucionales en Bolivia”. Documento de Trabajo R-350, Washington: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo. 
 
Gray-Molina, G. (2004). “Popular Participation and Poverty Reduction in Bolivia”, en: I. Licha (editora) 
Citizens in Charge Managing Local Budgets in East Asia and Latin America, Washington: Banco Inter-
americano de Desarrollo, pp. 223-245. 
 
Grootaert, C. and Narayan, D. (2004). “Local Institutions, Poverty and Household Welfare in Bolivia”, 
World Development Vol. 32 No. 7, pp. 1179-1198. 
 
Hines, James R. and Thaler, Richard H. (1995). “Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect”, The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 9(4), 217-226. 
 
Inchauste, G. (2009). “Decentralization in Bolivia: has it made a difference?”, en: E. Ahmad, y G. Brosio 
(editores), Does Decentralization Enhance Service Delivery and Poverty Reduction?, Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 161-191. 
 
Jin, Hehui, Yingyi Qian and Barry Weingast (2005). Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: 
Federalism, Chinese Style. Journal of Public Economics No. 89, pp. 1719-1742. 
 
Kornai, Janos (1986). The Soft Budget Constraint. Kyklos 39 (1), 3-30. 
 
Kornai, Janos, Eric Maskin, and Gérard Roland (2003). “Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint”, 
Journal of Economic Literature 41, 1095-1136. 
 
Luján, M. (2004). “Gobernabilidad Municipal: Análisis de la Aplicación del Voto Constructivo de Censura” 
en: Municipalización: Diagnóstico de una Década, Tomo II, La Paz: Plural Editores – FES/ILDIS, pp. 145-
185. 
 
  
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Andrey Timofeev (2009). “Decentralization Measures Revisited”, Working 
Paper 09-13, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. 
 
Ministerio de Autonomías (2011). Estado de situación sociodemográfica de los municipios de Bolivia 
(2005-2009). Observatorio Bolivia Democrática. La Paz: Editorial Presencia. 
 
Musgrave, Richard (1959). “The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy”, New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
 
North, Douglass (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Oates, Wallace E. (1972). “Fiscal Federalism”, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
 
Oates, Wallace E. (2005). Toward a second generation theory of fiscal federalism. International Tax and 
Public Finance 12, 349-373. 
 
O'Donnell, G. (1993). “On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American 
View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries”, World Development Vol. 21 No. 8, pp. 1355–1369. 
 
O'Neill, K. M. (2003). “Decentralization as an Electoral Strategy”, Comparative Political Studies Vol. 36 No. 
9, Noviembre, pp. 1068-1091. 
 
---------------- (2005). “Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties, and Local Power in the Andes”, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo – PNUD (2007b). “El estado del Estado en Bolivia”, 
Informe Nacional sobre Desarrollo Humano, La Paz. 
 
Prud’homme, Remy and Decv (1995). “On the Dangers of Decentralization”, World Bank Economic Review 
Vol. 10 No. 2, pp. 201-220. 
 
Qian, Yingyi and Barry Weingast (1997).  Federalism as a commitment to preserving market incentives. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 (4), 83-92. 
 
Reid, G. J. and Malik, W. H. (1994), Overview, en: Chaudhry, S. A., Reid, G. J. y Malik, W. H. (editores), 
Civil Service Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean, Washington D.C., World Bank Technical Paper 
Number 259. 
 
Roca, J. L. (2005). “Fisonomía del Regionalismo Boliviano. La otra Cara de la Historia”, Santa Cruz: 
Editorial El País, Tercera Edición. 
 
------------ (2007). “Estatalidad: Entre la Pugna Regional y el Institucionalismo”, Cuadernos de Futuro 21, 
Regiones y Poder Constituyente en Bolivia. Una Historia de Pactos y Disputas, 
 
Rodríguez Ostria, G. (1995). “Estado y Municipio en Bolivia: La Ley de Participación Popular en una 
Perspectiva Histórica”, La Paz: Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Medio Ambiente, Secretaría Nacional 
de Participación Popular. 
 
Rojas Ortuste, G. (1997). “El Diseño del Estado (y Sociedad) Pluralista. La Construcción Boliviana de la 
Democracia” en: El Pulso de la Democracia: Participación Ciudadana y Descentralización en Bolivia, 
Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, Secretaría Nacional de Participación Popular. Caracas: Editorial Nueva 
Sociedad, pp. 211-238. 
 
Villarroel-Böhrt, Sergio (2005). “Balanzas fiscales departamentales y costeo en la administración pública”, 
Estudio No. 1 de la serie: Documentos de Trabajo hacia la Constituyente. La Paz: Plural Editores. 
  
 
Weingast, Barry (1995). The economic role of political institutions: Market-preserving federalism and 
economic development. The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization No. 11, pp. 1-31. 
 
Weingast, Barry (2009). Second Generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives. Journal 
of Urban Economics No. 65, pp. 279-293. 
 
Wiesner, Eduardo (2003). “Fiscal Federalism in Latin America: From Entitlements to Markets”, 
Washington: Inter-American Development Bank. 
 
Wildasin, David (2004). “The Institutions of Federalism: Toward an Analytical Framework”. National Tax 
Journal, Vol. LVII, No. 2, Part 1, 247-272 
 
  
ANNEX A 
Detail of transfers to municipalities 
Transfer Source of funds Distribution criteria 
Sector conditionality and by 
type of expenditure 
Revenue sharing 
(Coparticipacion 
tributaria) 
20% of current income 
from IVA, IT, RC-IVA, 
IUE, ICE, GA, ISAE, 
ITGB 
Municipal population 
according to the 
census. 
-85% for investment and 15% for 
current expenditures. 
-7% of the 20% for the SUMI 
program. 
-40% of the annual SMGV 
bonus. 
Social and 
Productive 
Investment Fund 
(FPS) 
- Official International 
Cooperation to the 
Government of Bolivia. 
- Credit from Multilateral 
Organizations. 
-70% to municipalities 
according to poverty 
levels. 
-30% in equal shares 
to the nine prefectures, 
distributed to 
municipalities based 
on poverty levels. 
- Defined by the international 
donor. Priority areas in the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy: 
education, health, sanitation, 
rural energy, rural development, 
natural resources and 
environment. 
Debt relief 
initiative for 
Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries 
(HIPC II) 
Debt Relief Program 
 
Poverty levels 
Resources are channeled 
through: 
- The Municipal Solidarity Fund 
for School Education and Public 
Health (U.S. $ 27 million per 
year, 70% for primary and 
secondary education and 30% for 
health) and the SUMI National 
Solidarity Fund. 
- The 2002 National Dialogue 
Special Account receives the 
difference (10% for health, 20% 
for school maintenance and 
equipment and 70% for 
infrastructure). 
Direct 
Hydrocarbons 
Tax (IDH) 
From the 32% tax on the 
value of hydrocarbons 
production, 58% goes to 
departments divided 
between prefectures, 
municipalities and 
universities. 
According to Decree 
29322 of 24/10/2007, 
municipalities receive 
66.99% of IDH, which 
is distributed to 
beneficiaries according 
to the number of 
inhabitants of the 
municipal 
jurisdiction.* 
Municipalities: education, health, 
local economic development, 
promotion of employment and 
collective security. 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2006). 
(*) In practice municipalities receive approximately 40% before the distribution of the Renta Dignidad and 
between 31% and 35% after contributing to such rent (according to approximations made by the Fundacion 
Jubileo (2009) and Medinaceli (2007) ). 
ICE: Specific consumption tax; GA: customs tariff; ISAE: Abroad departures tax; ITGB: Free asset transfer 
tax; SUMI: Mother-child universal insurance; SMGV: Free old-age medical insurance. 
  
ANNEX B 
Detail of transfers to prefectures 
Transfer Source of funds 
Distribution 
Criteria 
Conditionality sector and by 
type of expenditure 
Revenue sharing 
of the Special Tax 
on Hydrocarbons 
and Derivatives 
(IEHD) 
25% of IEHD 
-50% on the basis of 
population. 
-50% equally among 
departments. 
Road infrastructure of the 
National Road Service (SNC) (as 
counterpart to SNC projects). 
Departmental 
Compensation 
Fund (FCD) 
10% of IEHD that 
corresponds to the 
national level budget. 
The amount required 
by departments to 
reach the national 
average per capita 
royalty 
Open 
Hydrocarbons 
Royalties 
-11% of the Department 
hydrocarbons production 
value. 
-1% of the national 
hydrocarbons production 
value goes to royalty 
compensation for the 
Beni (2/3) and Pando 
(1/3) Departments. 
Received only by 
those departments 
where hydrocarbon 
production occurs 
and, in the case of 
royalty compensation 
also Beni and Pando 
Open 
Direct 
Hydrocarbons 
Tax 
(IDH) 
From the 32% tax on the 
hydrocarbons production 
value, 58% goes to 
departments divided 
between prefectures, 
municipalities and 
universities. 
According Decree 
29322 of 24/10/2007, 
prefectures receive 
24.4% of IDH* 
Departments: social economic 
development, collective security. 
(*) In practice prefectures receive about 16% before the distribution of the Renta Dignidad and about 10% 
after contributing to such rent (according to approximations made by the Fundacion Jubileo (2009) and 
Medinaceli (2007). 
  
ANNEX C 
 
Table C1: Calculating revenue decentralization (RR*) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Prefectures own 
revenues 
       
32,841,710    
       
30,813,411    
       
25,898,505    
       
26,089,203    
       
25,345,045    
       
21,795,745    
       
23,366,072    
       
35,113,134            35,650,302    
Municipalities own 
revenues 
     
360,020,758    
     
375,237,914    
     
342,393,752    
     
391,512,326    
     
504,990,608    
     
457,591,835    
     
472,522,544    
     
493,037,899    
       
511,615,022    
Overall government 
revenues 
  
4,812,967,649    
  
4,694,835,541    
  
4,764,847,504    
  
3,778,353,523    
  
4,734,801,521    
  
5,110,209,396    
  
5,850,320,589    
  
6,156,261,035    
  
10,319,758,798    
Department RR 0.68% 0.66% 0.54% 0.69% 0.54% 0.43% 0.40% 0.57% 0.35% 
Municipal RR 7.48% 7.99% 7.19% 10.36% 10.67% 8.95% 8.08% 8.01% 4.96% 
*Where: RR = Own Revenue / Overall Government Revenue. Based on Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009). 
Prefecture own revenue = Non-tax revenue + Sales of goods & services + Interests and other property rents + Own capital revenue. (Source: ForoDac) 
Municipal own revenue = Tax revenues + Other taxes + Non-tax revenues + Sales of goods & services + Operating revenues + Interest and other rents 
+ Own capital revenues. (Source: ForoDac). 
Overall government revenue = Tax revenues + Sales of goods & services + other current revenue (Source: UDAPE). 
 
Table C2: Calculation of allocated expenditure decentralization (ER*) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Own revenue + 
Prefectures PP Transfers 
       
1,249,701,669    
       
1,499,730,972    
       
1,443,975,231    
       
1,771,625,038    
       
1,924,623,825    
       
2,368,878,543    
       
2,549,343,466    
       
3,016,255,163    
         
2,919,214,301    
Own revenue + 
Municipal PP Transfers 
          
802,991,382    
          
811,930,443    
          
882,090,990    
       
1,051,876,314    
       
1,345,140,274    
       
1,344,927,929    
       
1,841,956,059    
       
1,944,722,513    
         
2,326,601,377    
Overall government 
revenues 
       
4,812,967,649    
       
4,694,835,541    
       
4,764,847,504    
       
3,778,353,523    
       
4,734,801,521    
       
5,110,209,396    
       
5,850,320,589    
       
6,156,261,035    
       
10,319,758,798    
Prefectural ER 26.0% 31.9% 30.3% 46.9% 40.6% 46.4% 43.6% 49.0% 28.3% 
Municipal ER 16.7% 17.3% 18.5% 27.8% 28.4% 26.3% 31.5% 31.6% 22.5% 
*Where: ER = (own revenue + Public Policy transfers) / Overall government revenue. Based on Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009). 
Public Policy prefecture transfers = Royalties + Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH) + Special Tax on Hydrocarbons (IEH) + Subsidies or grants + 
Municipal Solidarity Fund + Departmental Compensation Fund + Other public policy. (Source: ForoDac). 
Public Policy municipal transfers = Revenue sharing + Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH) + 2000 Dialogue Law HIPC-II (Source: ForoDac). 
 
Table C3: Calculation of the composite decentralization coefficient (CR = RR/(1-ER)) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Prefectural CR 0.9% 1.0% 0.8% 1.3% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 1.1% 0.5% 
Municipal CR (left axis) 9.0% 9.7% 8.8% 14.4% 14.9% 12.2% 11.8% 11.7% 6.4% 
               Source: Own elaboration based on Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009). 
 
                    Figure C1 Figure C2    Figure C3 
Revenue Decentralization (RR)   Expenditure Decentralization (ER) Composite coefficient (CR=RR/(1-ER)) 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.00%
0.10%
0.20%
0.30%
0.40%
0.50%
0.60%
0.70%
0.80%
Municipalities Prefectures
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Prefectures Municipalities
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
1.2%
1.4%
CR Municipalities CR Prefectures
 
Source: Own elaboration.                   Source: Own elaboration.     Source: own elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ANNEX D 
 
Municipal revenue - expenditure correlation models for the period 2000-2008 
 
Expenditure pc 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
 
Own pc 
 
0.348*** 
(0.113)        
 
Tax pc  
0.217*** 
(0.065)       
 
Non-tax pc   
0.537*** 
(0.126)      
 
Not-own pc    
0.819*** 
(0.049)     
 
RevSharing pc     
1.384*** 
(0.183)    
 
IDH pc      
1.106*** 
(0.103)   
 
HIPC pc       
1.748*** 
(0.358)  
 
Donations pc        
0.896*** 
(0.128) 
 
NBI2001 
 
3.161*** 
(0.528) 
3.087*** 
(0.547) 
3.079*** 
(0.513) 
–0.284 
(0.220) 
3.134*** 
(0.515) 
0.989** 
(0.421) 
1.913*** 
(0.573) 
1.630*** 
(0.385) 
 
Poverty2001 
 
–2.158*** 
(0.532) 
–2.163*** 
(0.554) 
–2.141*** 
(0.523) 
0.359* 
(0.215) 
–2.357*** 
(0.513) 
0.477 
(0.505) 
–1.475*** 
(0.500) 
–1.759*** 
(0.522) 
 
Indigenous2001 
 
–1.463*** 
(0.261) 
–1.504*** 
(0.268) 
–1.433*** 
(0.257) 
–0.223*** 
(0.081) 
–1.440*** 
(0.258) 
–0.740*** 
(0.150) 
–1.361*** 
(0.235) 
–0.775*** 
(0.198) 
 
Agricultural2001 
 
–111.209*** 
(38.916) 
–117.843*** 
(40.221) 
–109.415*** 
(38.524) 
–34.151** 
(14.695) 
–116.157*** 
(38.291) 
–106.345*** 
(34.416) 
–114.603*** 
(36.326) 
–46.595* 
(27.402) 
 
Migration2001 
 
1.014*** 
(0.282) 
1.049*** 
(0.285) 
1.010*** 
(0.277) 
0.220*** 
(0.083) 
1.047*** 
(0.261) 
0.228 
(0.199) 
0.903*** 
(0.237) 
0.856*** 
(0.202) 
 
PrefecturalDec 
(CRD) 
–97.318** 
(41.049) 
–74.179* 
(41.361) 
–109.923*** 
(41.078) 
41.445** 
(20.700) 
–99.289** 
(39.439) 
28.576 
(30.718) 
–39.395 
(43.205) 
–15.095 
(32.650) 
 
Dept GDP pc 
 
21.309 
(18.636) 
20.328 
(19.223) 
22.117 
(18.199) 
5.691 
(5.551) 
21.124 
(18.802) 
47.192*** 
(16.190) 
18.546 
(18.752) 
–10.556 
(11.022) 
 
Valleys 
 
63.035*** 
(8.719) 
62.459*** 
(8.915) 
62.853*** 
(8.603) 
12.322*** 
(3.758) 
59.366*** 
(8.374) 
34.358*** 
(7.674) 
51.239*** 
(7.832) 
35.992*** 
(7.112) 
 
LowLands 
 
–25.710 
(19.904) 
–24.971 
(20.211) 
–26.005 
(19.725) 
3.233 
(6.400) 
–16.480 
(19.827) 
–45.257** 
(19.050) 
–30.065 
(18.995) 
18.246 
(12.818) 
 
Constant 
 
98.248 
(61.581) 
115.461* 
(65.123) 
99.360* 
(60.218) 
23.009 
(18.967) 
48.675 
(61.780) 
–62.201 
(51.636) 
150.790** 
(62.341) 
169.175*** 
(44.082) 
 
 
Observations 
Groups 
R2 intragroup 
R2 intergroup 
R2 global 
tetha 
2817 
313 
0.297 
0.635 
0.403 
0.219 
2817 
313 
0.299 
0.614 
0.398 
0.255 
2817 
313 
0.294 
0.646 
0.404 
0.194 
2817 
313 
0.798 
0.948 
0.845 
0.000 
2817 
313 
0.328 
0.658 
0.432 
0.225 
2817 
313 
0.633 
0.740 
0.665 
0.376 
2817 
313 
0.322 
0.688 
0.436 
0.196 
2817 
313 
0.556 
0.773 
0.624 
0.218 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Estimated by random-effects, however, when tetha is closer to one becomes a 
within estimator (Cameron and Trivedi, page 256). All regressions included year dummies and dummies for 
each Department capital city, which were not reported due to space restrictions. Numbers in parentheses are 
robust standard errors.  ***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
  
ANNEX E 
 
Municipal balance - revenue correlation models for the period 2000-2008 
 
Balance pc 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
 
Own pc 
 
0.678*** 
(0.085)        
 
Tax pc  
0.748*** 
(0.069)       
 
Non-tax pc   
0.606*** 
(0.096)      
 
Not-own pc    
0.185*** 
(0.047)     
 
RevSharing pc     
0.461*** 
(0.102)    
 
IDH pc      
0.155** 
(0.075)   
 
HIPC pc       
0.400*** 
(0.091)  
 
Donations pc        
0.267*** 
(0.050) 
 
NBI2001 
 
0.901*** 
(0.149) 
0.864*** 
(0.161) 
0.693*** 
(0.144) 
–0.116 
(0.215) 
0.675*** 
(0.155) 
0.335** 
(0.163) 
0.384** 
(0.162) 
0.227 
(0.202) 
 
Poverty2001 
 
–0.957*** 
(0.243) 
–1.020*** 
(0.246) 
–0.936*** 
(0.239) 
–0.392** 
(0.200) 
–1.050*** 
(0.241) 
–0.609*** 
(0.182) 
–0.824*** 
(0.220) 
–0.859*** 
(0.278) 
 
Indigenous2001 
 
–0.029 
(0.082) 
–0.056 
(0.083) 
–0.024 
(0.080) 
0.202*** 
(0.077) 
–0.037 
(0.079) 
0.034 
(0.062) 
–0.029 
(0.079) 
0.153* 
(0.091) 
 
Agricultural2001 
 
8.607 
(14.603) 
–2.871 
(14.915) 
4.672 
(14.589) 
13.339 
(14.087) 
–4.861 
(14.920) 
–2.713 
(13.542) 
–4.921 
(14.036) 
15.263 
(17.274) 
 
Migration2001 
 
–0.027 
(0.091) 
0.001 
(0.086) 
0.003 
(0.086) 
–0.138* 
(0.076) 
0.033 
(0.081) 
–0.069 
(0.071) 
0.003 
(0.078) 
–0.022 
(0.090) 
 
PrefecturalDec 
(CRD) 
–98.054*** 
(20.376) 
–100.672*** 
(20.213) 
–96.259*** 
(21.017) 
–40.518** 
(21.042) 
–99.833*** 
(20.819) 
–76.400*** 
(23.484) 
–78.681*** 
(21.570) 
–65.205*** 
(18.528) 
 
Depart GDP pc 
 
–0.318 
(4.969) 
0.292 
(4.996) 
0.200 
(4.972) 
–4.834 
(5.636) 
0.062 
(5.012) 
2.151 
(4.186) 
–0.719 
(5.162) 
–9.335 
(6.259) 
 
Valleys 
 
–1.887 
(3.862) 
–2.484 
(3.865) 
–2.706 
(3.871) 
–14.699*** 
(3.614) 
–4.250 
(3.935) 
–6.914** 
(2.973) 
–5.865 
(3.646) 
–11.265*** 
(4.241) 
 
LowLands 
 
–9.829 
(6.799) 
–9.503 
(6.835) 
–9.510 
(6.778) 
–2.126 
(6.161) 
–6.207 
(6.720) 
–11.530** 
(5.584) 
–10.130 
(6.457) 
3.901 
(8.326) 
 
Constant 
 
15.025 
(23.384) 
35.992 
(23.135) 
35.540 
(22.713) 
36.784** 
(18.215) 
32.904 
(22.191) 
36.356** 
(15.356) 
63.717*** 
(23.124) 
70.147*** 
(24.968) 
 
 
Observations 
Groups 
R2 intragroup 
R2 intergroup 
R2 global 
tetha 
2817 
313 
0.163 
0.256 
0.171 
0.000 
2817 
313 
0.139 
0.245 
0.149 
0.000 
2817 
313 
0.118 
0.230 
0.129 
0.000 
2817 
313 
0.203 
0.335 
0.215 
0.000 
2817 
313 
0.112 
0.214 
0.122 
0.000 
2817 
313 
0.115 
0.293 
0.132 
0.000 
2817 
313 
0.099 
0.252 
0.114 
0.000 
2817 
313 
0.208 
0.211 
0.203 
0.000 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Estimated by random-effects model. All regressions included year dummies and 
dummies for each Department capital city, which were not reported due to space restrictions. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
  
ANNEX F 
 
Municipal own to not-own revenue correlation models for the period 2000-2008 
 
Own pc 
 
(1) 
Con saldo 
(2) 
Con saldo 
(3) 
Con saldo 
(4) 
Con saldo 
(5) 
Sin saldo 
(6) 
Sin saldo 
(7) 
Sin saldo 
(8) 
Sin saldo 
 
Not-own pc 
 
–0.072** 
(0.028)    
–0.028*** 
(0.010)    
 
RevSharing pc  
0.066 
(0.040)    
0.135** 
(0.054)   
 
IDH pc   
–0.065*** 
(0.025)    
–0.041*** 
(0.013)  
 
HIPC pc    
–0.169* 
(0.092)    
–0.111 
(0.076) 
 
PersonalServ. pc 
 
 
0.958*** 
(0.306) 
0.422*** 
(0.134) 
0.680*** 
(0.191) 
0.591*** 
(0.183) 
0.646*** 
(0.206) 
0.346*** 
(0.113) 
0.588*** 
(0.170) 
0.536*** 
(0.179) 
Balance pc 
 
 
0.156** 
(0.078) 
0.105* 
(0.065) 
0.120* 
(0.069) 
0.112* 
(0.066)     
 
NBI2001 
 
–0.425*** 
(0.100) 
–.540*** 
(0.117) 
–0.499*** 
(0.104) 
–0.485*** 
(0.119) 
 
–0.428*** 
(0.113) 
0.453*** 
(0.113) 
–0.448*** 
(0.110) 
–0.441*** 
(0.127) 
 
Poverty2001 
 
0.200 
(0.133) 
0.189 
(0.148) 
0.143 
(0.123) 
0.191 
(0.139) 
0.081 
(0.113) 
0.051 
(0.117) 
0.051 
(0.112) 
0.086 
(0.118) 
 
Indigenous2001 
 
–0.073* 
(0.038) 
0.006 
(0.029) 
–0.024 
(0.028) 
0.004 
(0.028) 
–0.035 
(0.031) 
–0.004 
(0.028) 
–0.023 
(0.028) 
–0.004 
(0.027) 
 
Agricultural2001 
 
–14.565*** 
(5.455) 
–15.388** 
(6.247) 
–12.485** 
(5.630) 
–13.298** 
(5.772) 
–15.160** 
(5.942) 
–16.613*** 
(6.257) 
–13.821** 
(5.891) 
14.261** 
(5.878) 
 
Migration2001 
 
–0.005 
(0.076) 
0.010 
(0.063) 
0.016 
(0.070) 
–0.004 
(0.067) 
0.008 
(0.066) 
0.028 
(0.057) 
0.020 
(0.065) 
0.006 
(0.064) 
 
PrefecturalDec 
(CRD) 
11.623* 
(6.392) 
18.198** 
(7.592) 
16.019** 
(6.739) 
12.757* 
(6.764) 
3.008 
(7.537) 
7.320 
(7.281) 
5.370 
(7.077) 
3.717 
(8.078) 
 
Depart GDP pc 
 
3.451** 
(1.401) 
1.913* 
(1.111) 
0.552 
(0.875) 
2.311* 
(1.359) 
2.078*** 
(0.794) 
1.478** 
(0.683) 
0.674 
(0.730) 
1.799* 
(0.927) 
 
Valleys 
 
–5.455*** 
(2.045) 
–5.717** 
(2.302) 
–6.091*** 
(2.186) 
–5.881*** 
(2.217) 
–5.963*** 
(2.307) 
–5.486** 
(2.257) 
–6.212*** 
(2.349) 
–6.069*** 
(2.346) 
 
LowLands 
 
–4.847 
(3.288) 
0.178 
(2.475) 
–0.147 
(2.229) 
–0.545 
(2.401) 
–3.149 
(2.684) 
0.115 
(2.314) 
–1.155 
(2.382) 
–1.367 
(2.443) 
 
Constant 
 
27.721** 
(11.327) 
34.481*** 
(9.447) 
39.504*** 
(8.450) 
29.401** 
(11.915) 
42.268*** 
(6.868) 
40.614*** 
(7.006) 
46.790*** 
(6.698) 
39.882*** 
(7.680) 
 
 
Observations 
Groups 
R2 intragroup 
R2 intergroup 
R2 global 
Tetha 
2817 
313 
0.193 
0.672 
0.368 
0.276 
2817 
313 
0.133 
0.632 
0.316 
0.284 
2817 
313 
0.151 
0.661 
0.337 
0.268 
2817 
313 
0.135 
0.649 
0.323 
0.264 
2817 
313 
0.060 
0.630 
0.268 
0.257 
2817 
313 
0.061 
0.608 
0.261 
0.272 
2817 
313 
0.058 
0.629 
0.267 
0.258 
2817 
313 
0.051 
0.625 
0.261 
0.254 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Estimated by random-effects model. All regressions included year dummies and 
dummies for each Department capital city, which were not reported due to space restrictions. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. 
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
  
ANNEX G 
 
Value Added Tax (IVA) - departmental revenues correlation models* (2000-2008) 
 
IVA collection pc (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Royalities pc –0.091**      
 (0.037)      
IDH pc  –0.014**     
  (0.007)     
IEHD pc   –0.04**    
   (0.017)    
Comp. Fund. pc    1.778   
    (1.438)   
Other transfers pc     0.003  
     (0.017)  
Donations pc      0.211 
      (0.170) 
GDP pc 3.192** –0.649 –0.625 –0.351 –0.657 –0.986 
 (1.377) (0.571) (0.566) (0.579) (0.485) (0.622) 
PrefecturalDec. 791.315* 123.686 88.57 267.068 –35.366 –23.392 
 (468.1) (190.8) (182.8) (249.3) (213.6) (114.9) 
Population (thousands) 0.131*** 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.121*** 0.136*** 0.140*** 
 (0.009) (0.01) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Poverty (HCR) –4.539*** –4.908*** –4.934*** –5.221*** –4.783*** –5.061*** 
 (0.582) (0.785) (0.79) (1.401) (0.723) (0.822) 
Year 4.472** 5.675** 5.296** 4.64** 5.135** 5.706** 
 (1.980) (2.682) (2.542) (2.199) (2.477) (2.598) 
Valles44 23.87*** 20.99*** 21.66*** 24.40*** 22.75*** 25.15*** 
 (5.315) (6.42) (6.514) (8.326) (6.554) (6.902) 
CentralAxis –144.53*** –142.11*** –143.88*** –131.04*** –144.94*** –152.85*** 
 (18.911) (21.063) (21.712) (22.492) (20.278) (23.709) 
Constant –8.683.5** –11.038** –10.276** –8.947.7** –9.969.6** –11.093** 
 (3.953.4) (5.329.5) 5.048.1 4.312.2 4.932.7 5.160.5 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Groups 9 9 9 9 9 9 
R2 intragroup 0.430 0.395 0.372 0.4817 0.372 0.366 
R2 intergroup 0.997 0.991 0.991 0.977 0.988 0.991 
R2 global 0.930 0.920 0.918 0.918 0.915 0.917 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
*Estimated by random-effects model. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
44 For this estimate, we reduced the number of controls by statistical constraints. For this reason, highlands and plains 
were added to the reference mode for lack of a statistically significant difference in this model. 
  
Value Added Tax (IVA) -departmental revenues correlation models* (2000-2008) 
 
IVA collectionpc (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Royalities pc –0.091***      
 (0.020)      
IDH pc  –0.008     
  (0.005)     
IEHD pc   –0.009    
   (0.014)    
Comp. Fund pc    1.354**   
    (0.555)   
Other transfers pc     0.007  
     (0.011)  
Donations pc      0.167 
      (0.162) 
GDP pc 3.655*** –0.958** –0.887* –0.663 –0.787 –0.738 
 (1.132) (0.531) (0.554) (0.528) (0.568) (0.605) 
PrefecturalDec. –619.01 68.921 –169.86 675.162 –80.959 –208.451 
 (599.8) (583.9) (574.4) (662.6) (588.7) (506.7) 
MunicipalDec. 165.8*** 13.96 30.75 –20.71 27.72 36.80 
 (61.771) (57.042) (57.613) (63.816) (58.625) (52.644) 
Déficit45 –2.044 0.961 0.779 2.851 1.1 0.79 
 (2.659) (2.088) (1.963) (2.174) (1.738) (1.787) 
Population (in thousands) 0.129*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.127*** 0.138*** 0.139*** 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.02) (0.021) 
AverageGasPrice(–1)46 5.337* 2.371 3.283 –1.118 2.896 3.561 
 (3.002) (2.991) (2.995) (3.443) (2.996) (2.831) 
Poverty (HCR) –3.787*** –4.99*** –4.907*** –5.032*** –4.737*** –4.666*** 
 (0.742) (0.862) (0.878) (0.782) (0.953) (1.003) 
Year 0.409 3.532** 2.976** 4.781*** 3.033** 3.131** 
 (1.613) (1.516) (1.516) (1.730) (1.518) (1.450) 
Valleys 25.63*** 24.19*** 24.37*** 26.56*** 24.25*** 25.31*** 
 (4.687) (5.136) (5.711) (4.749) (6.371) (6.23) 
LowLands 9.514* 2.064 2.152 5.701 3.037 5.107 
 (5.469) (5.17) (5.698) (5.256) (6.895) (7.17) 
CentralAxis –135.0*** –149.4*** –149.0*** –137.4*** –146.0*** –146.0*** 
 (18.904) (23.361) (24.687) (23.577) (27.098) (28.038) 
Period 2006-2009 5.197* 7.285** 5.942* 5.462 5.916* 4.528 
 (2.836) (3.132) (3.1) (3.39) (3.117) (3.179) 
Constant –623.7 –6.749** –5.644* –9.246*** –5.774* –5.977** 
 (3.204) (3.011) (3.014) (3.444) (3.020) (2.876) 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Groups 9 9 9 9 9 9 
R2 0.919 0.871 0.854 0.85 0.822 0.822 
       
Source: Own elaboration. 
*Estimated by introducing an AR1 process. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for panel. 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
 
                                                             
45 Dummy variable indicating whether the prefecture had a fiscal deficit or not. 
46 Average price of gas exported to Argentina and Brazil, delayed a year. 
  
ANNEX H 
 
Prefecture revenue - oil price correlation models
47
 
 
Revenue (thousand Bs.) Total Revenue Total 
Revenue pc 
Royalties Royalties pc IDH + IEHD  IDH+IEHD 
pc 
Oil price48 2271.2*** 7.118*** 838.9*** 2.108** 1451.2*** 5.675* 
 (641.5) (1.503) (281.6) (0.980) (274.8) (3.255) 
Gas exported 92.6 0.293 –7.6 –0.027 282.4*** 0.708 
 (101.4) (0.271) (47.7) (0.168) (67.7) (0.653) 
Déficit –12730* 2.537 –427.5 0.576 –1820.2 34.61 
 (7.150) (39.99) (2.370) (9.187) (2.688) (54.37) 
Population (thousands) 297.0 0.060 151.3 0.301 2.5 –0.258 
 (85.2) (0.318) (106.5) (0.174) (3.7) (0.296) 
Poverty (HCR) –8579* –37.19* –8.799 –25.41* –89.6 –9.36 
 (4790) (22.2) (6.083) (15.09) (295.4) (11.16) 
Valleys 69.424** 64.13 95.237 185.0** –3928 –97.97 
 (31.214) (149.0) (60.216) (101.9) (2.533) (138.4) 
LowLands –57.687*** –94.62 –21781 –73.6 –1752* 38.35 
 (19.693) (63.83) (26232) (47.9) (977) (34.33) 
CentralAxis –302.172** –651.9 –303.549 –770.0* 4956 180.9 
 (153.079) (498.9) (227.448) (435.3) (7847.3) (238.7) 
Year 2008 –30.986** –267.6*** –14512*** –60.3*** –48015*** –332.3*** 
 (13.171) (35.5) (5652) (20.1) (6715) (63.3) 
Year 6292** 14.6* 4.039** 11.5* –12.162*** –14.6 
 (3039) (8.20) (1.876) (6.23) (2.822) (33.6) 
       
Observations 117 117 117 117 81 81 
Groups 9 9 9 9 9 9 
R2 0.645 0.1676 0.1876 0.199 0.925 0.176 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Estimated by introducing an AR1 process. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors corrected for panel. 
Constants were omitted. 
***Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                             
47 The first four columns covers years 1996-2008. For the last two columns the series is reduced to years 2000-2008. 
48 Both oil prices and the volume of gas exported are lagged variables. 
